Towards absolute monarchy in France

Already in the mid-fifteenth century, the English political theorist Sir John For­tescue characterized France as a dominium regale and England as a dominium regale et politicum, in accordance with contemporary terminology, i.e.

As we have seen, Philip Augustus’ conquest of the English fiefs in 1202—6 marks one step in the process of centralization in France. This meant that Normandy and the other former English provinces were added to the royal domain, which in principle was governed directly by the king, through his appointed officials. However, an important factor in King Philip’s success in this area was support from the local aristocracy, which evidently retained much of its influence even after the conquest. Moreover, the conquered provinces kept their laws and customs. This was probably the only way for the king to control the country, but it resulted in France becoming a kingdom composed of a number of provinces governed in very different ways until the centralization under the Revolution and Napoleon. By contrast, Edward I’s conquest of Wales in the late thirteenth century led to a massive introduction of English law and administration.²⁶

Several great principalities continued to exist in the following centuries and the king’s position was seriously weakened for long periods during the Hun­dred Years War. In the long run, he nevertheless increased his control of the country, partly by taking over several of the principalities, partly by developing the central administration and the supreme court of appeal in Paris. French kings often married into princely families and in some cases inherited their principalities; most of the great princes were the king’s relatives.

However, the formation of the kingdom of France should not only be regarded as a series of conquests that increased the territory under the king’s direct control. As we have seen, the increasing links between the king and the leading nobles in the period until the building of Versailles were also crucial. In the thirteenth cen­tury, the long reign of St Louis was of particular importance. Louis was one of the last kings in Europe to be canonized, whereas previously, royal saints had been common, notably in England and in the newly converted countries.²⁷ Louis’ sanctity was an important factor in the development of the French monarchy, notably the combination of saint and real knight, having twice been on Crusades and showing his personal skill and courage in fighting in a way that impressed his vassals, although some objections might be directed at his qualities as a general. Moreover, his possession of the main royal virtue, justice in judgement, is expres­sed by the picture of him, sitting outdoors and urging all who sought justice to approach him personally. In particular, the sources refer to a large oak at the palace at Vincennes, under which Louis used to sit — there is still an oak in the place today. Louis’ reign also had a reputation for being a time of wealth and internal peace; concerning the former, it stands as a contrast to the many demands for money made by his grandson Philip IV. For his part, Philip exploited his grand­father for what he was worth. He was active in securing his canonization and during the following conflict with the pope, he used the piety and sanctity of the French kings, of course, including Louis, as an argument.

Already around 1300, there is a clear difference between English and French government. Whereas England had no royal saint comparable to St Louis — Edward the Confessor had died 250 years before — France had no institution comparable to the English Parliament. Admittedly, France also had an institution called Parliament with a continual existence until the Revolution but this was the highest court of law in the country. In the Middle Ages, there was a vague dis­tinction between legal and political assemblies but the difference increased over the centuries. At no time, however, had the French Parliament (the Parliament of Paris) been a representative institution like the English one. Large assemblies of estates, divided into clergy, nobles and commoners, were summoned on various occasions, for instance, in 1302 and in 1329, after the change of dynasty from the Capetians to the Valois. However, as the French kings never managed to make their assemblies grant taxes, these bodies did not attain the same importance as the English Parliament and gradually disappeared from the fifteenth century onwards. After the assembly of 1484, the next one did not meet until 1560 — both took place during a regency, as did also most of the following ones. The period of the wars of religion meant a revival, but the assembly 1610—14, during the minority of Louis XIII, was the last before the one that led to the Revolution (1789). By contrast, regional assemblies were more frequent and important and some of them continued to meet until the eighteenth century.²⁸

The various crises in France during the later Middle Ages and the early modern period and the largely decentralized character of the country until the age of the Revolution and Napoleon may serve as a warning against exaggerating the amount of state formation in the country during this period. However, neither should it be underestimated. Despite a series of setbacks, the king always regained his power and mostly increased it.

As the result of the Hundred Years War, the king of France managed to intro­duce a permanent tax to finance a standing army, first, under Charles V, and then later and permanently under Charles VII. At the time Fortescue compared the two countries, France seemed to have been better off financially than England and in addition more stable politically. As late as in the mid-seventeenth century, English taxes were significantly lower than the French; altogether, they amounted to less than one of the French taxes, the gabelle. ³⁰ France was one of the first countries to introduce the military revolution, using artillery to conquer the English castles in 1450—53 and creating a standing army. When Henry VIII sought to imitate his predecessors by invading France in 1543, it ended in disaster; France was now militarily superior to England. As we have seen, the French king invaded Italy in 1494 and fought an almost continuous war against the king of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor — from 1519 united in the person of Charles V.

Internally, the around 200 years from the end of the Hundred Years War to Louis XIV’s accession to the throne made Fortescue’s characterization of the French monarchy a reality. Two main factors brought about this, namely, the increased frequency and costs of war and internal conflicts. The traditional taxes were insufficient to finance Francis I’s wars, even if they were increased dras­tically. As a result, he resorted to sales of offices on a large scale, a practice that continued and increased in the following period, during the wars of religion, 1562—98, and the participation in the Thirty Years War, and the war against Spain, 1635—59.

Venality of some offices goes back to the early Middle Ages but, as we have seen, the conquests in the thirteenth century introduced a system of local officers strictly controlled by the king. They were paid by a part of the revenues of their districts but they depended on the king and could be moved and deposed by him. The introduction of venal offices changed this. There was little control with the qualifications and character of the officers and eventually, they also became free to appoint their successors. This became firmly established by Henry IV in 1604. Until then, the rule had been that a royal officer who sold or transferred his office had to survive for 40 days for the transaction to be valid, which meant that it could only with difficulty be transferred to his heir by death. Henry introduced the paulette, a tax of 1/60 of the value of the office per year, which gave exemption from the 40-days rule. In this way, the king had given up most of his control of his officers in return for a fixed income. Admittedly, there were also non-venal officers called commissaires who were appointed and could be deposed by the king and who were supposed to control the venal officers. As there were around 45,000 venal officers under Louis XIV and only 300 full-time commissaires, it goes without saying that this control must have been very limited.³¹

Venality of offices was particularly important in France but is to be found in many other countries as well, mostly in southern Europe: Spain and Italy, in the latter with the exception of Florence and Venice. It did occur in northern Europe as well, e.g. Britain and Scandinavia, but only in shorter periods or to a limited degree. It was also rarely practised in Germany and Austria. The geographic dis­tribution of the practice, mainly in Catholic countries, and its early introduction by the papacy may suggest the latter as the source of inspiration.

Despite the venality of offices, taxes were also necessary and there were more than a hundred violent tax rebellions in the last decade of Richelieu’s rule alone.³³ Taxation increased drastically from the sixteenth century onwards: the net income of the state was 200 tons of silver around 1560, which increased to 400 between 1600 and 1630, to 500 in 1645 and 800 around 1690.³⁴ As the nobles and in practice also a number of other wealthy people were exempt from taxes, this meant a heavy burden on ordinary people, notably the pea­sants, in addition to limiting the sums that could actually be levied. Admit­tedly, indirect taxes were a considerable source of income, in addition to the possibility of levying extraordinary taxes on the nobles. At the same time, Richelieu and his successor, Mazarin, had amassed great wealth and created an extensive system of patronage, reactions against which were largely the cause of the Fronde, a series of rebellions during Louis XIV's minority, which made a deep impression on him; his style of government can largely be explained as an attempt to prevent a similar disaster from happening again. Constitutional government was not regarded as a realistic alternative in France, as it had never really worked.

When Louis took over, he was hardly in a position to reform the system root and branch. He may have found the sales of offices unsatisfactory and wished for a more efficient local administration but he could not afford to provoke the leading men of the local communities. The only way he could rule was by creating a system of patronage that involved most of the leading people in the country, which he did at Versailles. While Charles I provoked his subjects, including the nobility, by insisting on his absolute power, High Church Angli­canism and the attempt to rule without Parliament, Louis made the nobles his clients by gathering them around him in Versailles and securing the loyalty of local elites by continuing the system of venality of offices. In addition, his leading ministers, notably Colbert, created similar links through an elaborate system of patronage. Louis XIV had the largest and most modern army in Europe since Roman times; it may in periods have consisted of 300,000—400,000 men, which is approximately the same as the Romans mobilized from a far larger empire. However, this centralization of power came at a cost. The financial surplus from the mid-fifteenth century was long gone. After the reign of Henry IV (1589— 1610), annual expenses most of the time exceeded the incomes.³⁵ Nor can the extensive bureaucracy be regarded as an instrument in controlling society but rather as a means to gain support from local elites.³⁶

Fukuyama applies the term ‘weak absolutism’ to France and Spain, meaning the combination of the absence of formal limits to the king’s power and inefficient government. At least regarding the reign of Louis XIV, this seems an exaggeration. An inefficient administration would hardly have been able to mobilize the largest and strongest army in Europe, and in times of crisis, Louis was also able to make the nobles pay taxes. He also mostly succeeded in appointing well-qualified people to the most important military and civilian offices.³⁷ On the other hand, there were limits to absolutism. The king was obliged to respect the fundamental rights of this subjects, notably that of property, and although he might legislate, he had to respect divine and natural law.³⁸