Why Did the Caliph Not Become a Sort of Pope?

Was the Gesta Francorum right in describing the caliph as a sort of pope? In many ways, yes. Both claimed a sort of universal hegemony. Both were considered central religious figures, and neither had true political power outside a much smaller area (parts of Mesopotamia and parts of Central Italy, respectively).

However, in some ways, the comparison was misleading. The caliph did not have the same dogmatic and administrative powers in Islam as the pope did in Roman Catholicism. Even within Sunni Islam, the caliph was not in a position to declare what was the right doctrine. Or, should he make the attempt, his opinion would not be conceived as a doctrine issued from an authority with universal jurisdiction, but rather as just another authority within Sunni Islam.

It must be remembered that there is a very clear distinction in Islamic history between the Shari'a, the law, on one hand, and the security of the state, on the other hand. The law was conceived as something that had already been laid down by the Qur'an and the hadith (anecdotic examples of proper conduct provided by Muhammad). In Shi‘a Islam, much more interpretative room has been vested in the imamate than in the caliphate of the Sunni tradition, with the imam considered to be the major doctrinal authority in his own right. This is much less the case in the Sunni tradition from the Abbasids onward. The caliph (or in his place a regional ruler) could appoint judges and religious advisers in his domain, but was not in his own right a doctrinal authority.

Instead, the prerogative powers of the caliph consisted essentially of maintaining the already existing law of the Islamic society, and at the same time suppressing everything that threatened his protection. Patricia Crone went so far as to state that the power of the sultan is in deficit on legitimacy since it is the ulema (the Islamic literati) that possess the knowledge of the law.^[1593] This is definitely going too far, exactly because there is no official authority to speak on behalf of the whole ulema.

But she had a point; it happened over and over again in Islamic history that new dynasties emerged from the desert, spurred by purist interpretations of Islam, and overthrew the established polities without the ulema mobilizing any organized support in favor of the hitherto legitimate rulers. In the late eleventh century, the small taifa kingdoms of Islamic Spain (successor states to the disintegrated Andalusian emirate) were invaded and absorbed by the North African Almoravids, who wanted to rid Andalusia of un-Islamic customs and rejuvenate the holy war against the Christians. The territorial gains from this venture were modest, though. A century later, Andalusia was invaded again by another dynasty from the desert, the Almohads, who wanted to—well—rid Andalusia of un-Islamic customs and rejuvenate the holy war against the Christians.^[1594] There is no equivalent of this scheme in medieval Christian Europe. Scottish highlanders or any other European version of the Bedouin did not take control of the densely settled areas with the intention of re-establishing true Christianity. This may be related to the fact that Christianity is not a religion of law like Islam, but also to the less prominent geopolitical position of tribal societies north of the Mediterranean.

In the Sunni Islamic tradition, only the first four caliphs, the rashidun or rightly guided caliphs, were seen as real doctrinal authorities, with the power of making significant interpretations of the law. These four rulers (632-661 ce) were all companions, friends, and close relatives of Muhammad. From then on, the caliphs were rulers, but not major doctrinal authorities in their own right.

The Islamic polity has been described as (ideally) neither autocracy nor theocracy, but rather nomocracy. The law, the Shari‘a, is seen as above the level of the state. It precedes the state. Lawmaking is therefore considered to be outside the functions of the state. This does not mean that the caliphate was not a potent government in its heyday.

Quite the contrary; the caliph's power to secure the state and demand obedience were almost without limits.^[1595] This did not entail arbitrary rights in taxation, where Islamic jurisprudence is rather clear in its identification of lawful and illegal. But as the commander of coercive forces, the caliph or those acting in his place have been almost without institutional constraints in executing anyone who is believed to threaten the domestic security. In a different context, the classical Islamic attitude has been summed up by Denis J. Law as follows:

as long as the ruler stays shy of outright apostasy, his rule is considered legitimate even if it differs significantly from the ideal outlined by the jurisprudents.^[1596]

With this knowledge, it is easy to understand why the caliphate disintegrated in the way it did. When the central government ceased to receive taxes from a certain province, and the governor could not be dismissed (without full-scale invasion), this governor had thereby essentially assumed all the prerogatives of the caliph (except the aforementioned ceremonial ones). ^[1597] He could finance his own army and wage wars. He could appoint judges to arbitrate in conflicts between his subjects according to the Shari‘a. He could take any measure to secure the obedience of his subjects, including capital punishment. He could take council from the urban class of lettered Muslims, the ulema—perhaps even appoint an official advisor in Islamic matters—but neither of these would be inclined to curtail the quite formidable extra-legal powers of the ruler. The caliph had this power, too, but only in the area directly controlled by him.

Here is an essential difference with the powers of the pope, who achieved considerable influence outside the “Patrimonium Petri” in central Italy. Why was this so? Obviously, the official status of the clergy within Christendom is also a part of the explanation. The pope is the apex of a clergy, formally and officially segregated from the laypeople.

The ulema is merely a social class, not a corps. Besides, there is no such thing as a higher ulema, like there is a higher clergy with bishops, archbishops, and cardinals—at least not before the developments in Safavid and Qadjar Persia. But that development was very late (post-1500) and only concerned the Iranian version of Shi‘a Islam. The ulema remained a class in Sunni Islam. This means that it has generally been very difficult for the ulema to make formal and unanimous statements. Someone is always supportive and someone is not. Timur Kuran sums up the situation as follows:

In sum, both the historical record and contemporary patterns suggest that the balance of power that is implied by the concept of rule of law cannot be achieved simply by declaring government accountable to the ulama.^[1598]

But another difference lies at the conception of law in medieval Europe. We can here ignore the various laws for the laymen and focus on the law of this clergy.

The Canon Law was not seen as something primordial, existing before the church. Canon Law had been developed gradually as a series of decisions issued at various councils and synods since the early history of the church. It was therefore in a state of slow but continuous development.^[1599] In this process, the Roman pontiff was a central figure for the simple reason that he was the highest-ranking clergyman in the area in which Latin was the liturgical language. In Latin Christendom, only he could summon the great councils held at the Lateran. Only he could issue bulls. And only he could grant full absolution (an essential part of launching a Crusade). What was new in the late eleventh century was the independence of the pope, not his formal status as the leader of the Western patriarchate.

So, we ended up with a sort of papal hegemony in the medieval West, which was different in its character than the faded majesty of the caliphate. But what was (in retrospective) the biggest fruit of this quasi-empire? Certainly not the Crusader states, the last of which were conquered by the Mamluks in 1291.

No, the greatest effect of the papal ambition was the development of a different type of kingdom in the Latin West: a kingdom defined by its specific jurisdiction, and whose constitution was guarded by its specific and formal representatives.

There are of course innumerable similarities and differences between medieval Christendom and Islam, but from the perspective of empire one major similarity and one major difference stand out. First, the idea of universal rule remained very strong in both civilizations, supported by two literary discourses that both put great emphasis on imperial/caliphal universalism. Regional kings and sultans were conceived, not as completely sovereign in all matters, but as dependent on ideologies of universal rule, especially regarding legitimacy.^[1600] On the other hand, different conceptions of law put the caliph after ca. 950 in a different position than the pope after 1050. The latter could establish a position for the Holy See with a few, but significant, imperial attributes in addition to the ones he shared with the caliph.^[1601]

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Source: Bang Peter F., Bayly C.A., Scheidel Walter (eds.). The Oxford World History of Empire. Volume Two: The History of Empires. Oxford University Press,2020. — 1352 p.. 2020

Why Did the Caliph Not Become a Sort of Pope?

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