The Men at the Top

Leonid Brezhnev, like his predecessor Khrushchev, was a Russian whose rise to power was closely associated with Ukraine. Unlike the impetuous and confrontational Khrushchev, the careful Brezhnev exerted influence by building a consensus for his policies within the Soviet oligarchy and by assuring this elite of stability and continuity.

During the Brezhnev era, Ukraine had two Communist party leaders, Petro Shelest and Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, whose policies, though differing, illustrated the issues confronting Soviet Ukrainian leaders and the context in which Ukrainian, that is, republic-level, politics are played out in the USSR today.

Shelest’s tenure as the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party lasted from 1963 to 1972 and it featured a resurgence of Ukrainian self-assertiveness. From the skimpy evidence that is available to Western analysts, it appears that this assertiveness was primarily a result of Shelest’s attempts to defend Ukrainian interests within the Soviet Union. Shelest was not, how-ever, a crypto-nationalist. Indeed, in many ways he was more of a hard-line Communist than his superiors in Moscow. There are indications that he was adamantly anti-Western, supported the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 lest its reformist tendencies “infect” Ukraine, neglected Western Ukraine, opposed concessions to workers, and preferred to concentrate on heavy industry rather than consumer goods.

But there was another aspect to Shelest that concerned the Kremlin even more. It seems the Ukrainian leader took seriously the promise of Ukrainian autonomy enshrined in the Soviet constitution and the principle that all nations within the USSR are equal. Hence, he was loath to acknowledge the Russians’ “elder brother” role within the Soviet Union. Probably the status Shelest wanted to attain for Ukraine was similar to that of Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, that is, of a thoroughly communist society but one whose specific economic and cultural needs were recognized by Moscow.

Ukraine’s economic interests were a major concern for Shelest. He demanded more Ukrainian input into the Soviet Union’s economic planning process and showed little enthusiasm for the economic development of Siberia, which meant the reduction of investment in Ukraine. When a group of Ukrainian economists provided him with data showing that Ukraine was being shortchanged in its economic relationship with the Soviet Union as a whole, Shelest became a strong proponent of reciprocity, that is, the principle that Ukraine should obtain funds, goods, and services from the USSR that were of equal value to those it contributed to the USSR.

Shelest was even more outspoken in defending Ukrainian linguistic and cultural rights. His speeches contained exhortations to Ukrainians to “treasure” their “beautiful Ukrainian language.” In 1965, Iurii Dadenkov, the Ukrainian minister of higher education and a close Shelest associate, called for the expanded use of Ukrainian in the universities and institutes. And in 1970, Shelest’s book, Our Soviet Ukraine, stressed, directly or by implication, the historical autonomy of Ukraine, the progressive role of the Cossacks, the tsarist exploitation of Ukraine, and the impressive achievements of Soviet Ukraine. Clearly, Shelest’s pride in his republic’s rapid transition from a backward agrarian land into a modern, industrialized, and technologically advanced society was unusually fierce and evident.

How can one explain such “particularism” in a disciplined, experienced, and apparently sincere Communist – a member of the Politburo, the Soviet Union’s highest ruling body? In all probability, Shelest and his many supporters in Ukraine took Soviet pronouncements about national equality within the USSR at face value. They saw no contradiction between the achievement of general Soviet goals, the modernization of Ukraine, and the retention of its national culture. Much like Skrypnyk in the 1920s, Shelest seemed to believe that the satisfaction of Ukrainian economic and cultural needs, not their suppression, was the most effective means of ensuring Soviet success in Ukraine. Shelest may have also concluded that his own personal success in effectively ruling Ukraine depended on the cooperation of the Ukrainian cultural, scientific, and political elite. And this meant paying attention to its specific concerns.

In May 1972 Shelest was removed from his post in Kiev on charges of being “soft” on Ukrainian nationalism and encouraging economic “localism.” His successor was Shcherbytsky, an ethnic Ukrainian, a long-time member of Brezhnev’s “Dnieper” clan, and a fierce political rival of Shelest. In a fashion reminiscent of the fratricidal political infighting among contestants for the hetman’s office in 17th- and 18th-century Ukraine, Shcherbytsky helped to undermine Shelest by repeatedly denouncing him to Moscow for his “local patriotism.” Since the fall of his rival, Shcherbytsky has managed to retain the position of the Communist party boss in Ukraine, and his lengthy tenure in this post is a record. What are the reasons for this success? To a large extent they result from a policy of complete subservience to Moscow. So obedient has he been in fulfilling Moscow’s instructions, so willing to sacrifice Ukraine’s economic interests, and so cooperative in exposing Ukraine to Russification that Shcherbytsky may well go down in history as the Little Russian (Maloros) par excellence.

Aided by his watchdog for ideological issues, Valentyn Malanchuk, and the chief of the Ukrainian KGB, V.V.

Yet these efforts did not bring him what he seems to have desired most – elevation to a top position in Moscow, perhaps even nomination as Brezhnev’s successor. Therefore, by the early 1980s there were indications that Shcherbytsky was paying more attention to his position in Ukraine by improving relations with its cultural elite and becoming somewhat less assiduous in pushing Moscow’s assimilationist policies. With the rise of the reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev to power in 1985, speculation was rife that Shcherbytsky’s days as the Ukrainian party leader were numbered. But to the surprise of many observers, he continued to retain his position, probably because of support from antireformists in the Kremlin.

If one takes the policies of these two important Ukrainian political leaders into account, what conclusions can one draw about their views of Ukraine and its role in the Soviet Union? Clearly, both Shelest and Shcherbytsky envisioned Ukraine’s future only in terms of communist ideology and within the context of the Soviet system. Neither was ready even to consider the idea of Ukraine’s independence. And each in his own way was an example of the tight control that Moscow exerts over Ukraine’s Communist leadership.

Yet the careers of these two men indicate that even in the strictly monitored Soviet political system surprisingly contrasting attitudes and policies toward Ukraine can emerge. As a proponent of equality of nations in the USSR and of a just balance in their economic relations, Shelest wanted Ukraine to be treated as an autonomous state within a genuine Soviet federation.

In some ways, the behavior and policies of Shcherbytsky can be likened to those of a Western corporate executive. For such a person, the USSR is probably not unlike a huge Moscow-based corporation. In this context, Ukraine is probably seen as a region of important branch plants, which, if run successfully (that is, according to the wishes of the men in the Kremlin), can catapult its manager to the height of the corporate power structure. Thus, when the interests of the “corporation” have demanded standardization (Russification) in Ukraine, Shcherbytsky has readily complied, arguing that adherence to “local particularities” (national culture) impeded efficiency and progress. When Ukraine was required to draw on its assets to aid the development of another unit of the “corporation,” Shcherbytsky has been forthcoming, thereby demonstrating his ability to “think big.” A problem with this branch-plant mentality – which may be considered a modern form of the old Little Russianism – is that those who espouse it often forget that they are dealing not only with administrative and socioeconomic units but with nations. The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)

The influence and importance of She-lest and Shcherbytsky reached far beyond the Ukrainian republic. The former was, and the latter continues to be, a major political player on the all-union level – as a result largely of the growth spurt experienced by the Communist Party of Ukraine after the Second World War, particularly after the death of Stalin. After Khrushchev came into power, membership in the Ukrainian party expanded rapidly. This growth, which was greater in Ukraine than in the other republics, continued throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.

The rise of a new generation of political leaders in Ukraine soon reflected this development. Leadership included more Ukrainians than ever before. Thus, in 1964, out of thirty-three top party officials in the republic, thirty were Ukrainians. The percentage of party members from Ukraine in the Central Committee of the USSR rose to an unprecedented high of 20% in 1961. Given its unusually rapid growth and its close ties with the Kremlin, the CPU earned a reputation as a “model” party in the USSR. But it was exactly this new sense of confidence and importance that led to frustration within the Ukrainian elite with the hypercentralized political and economic policies of the Kremlin. Hence Shelest’s autonomist tendencies. That these had the support of the vast majority of the Ukrainian party apparatus is evident: only three of the twenty-five Ukrainian oblast (regional) party secretaries voted for his ouster.

The fall of Shelest was also a setback to the Ukrainian party. Its numerical growth slowed and its representation in the Central Committee of the Soviet Union dropped to 15%. Nonetheless, the ability of the hard-liner Shcherbytsky to remain in power in Kiev for so long indicates that the Ukrainian party, which he leads, is still a factor of major importance in the Soviet political system.