After the demise of the Prophet in the 7th century, a young and expanding Muslim community was left without a leader.

The charismatic personality of the Prophet coupled with his divinely bestowed ability to receive direct revela­tion from God naturally made him a trusted and authoritative source of spiri­tual, ethical, legal, and political leadership.

The epistemological question of how Sharia (in both its broad and restricted usage) is known in the absence of the Prophet necessarily leads to the ques­tion of who has the authority, legitimacy, and qualifications to deduce and pro­mulgate Sharia knowledge. The vast range of responses historically given by Muslim scholars can perhaps be explained as one of the major contributing factors that shaped socio-political and theological schisms and sub-schisms within the Muslim community. Scholars and community leaders, whether they are theologians, hadith experts, jurists or even caliphs, held different opinions on how and who can arrive at Sharia knowledge.

1 See Peters and Bearman, “Introduction: The Nature of the Sharia”, 1-3; Mallat, The Renewal of I UiicLaw, 1-5,.

2 For a thorough narrative of the immediate socio-political upheavals after the demise of the Prophet see Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad; Modarressi, Tradition and; Momen, An InlouctiontoSliiTIm, 11-2¾', HaSaq, TheOiiginsanidEoutionof Islamic, 1-29.. that scholars and community leaders were exposed to. This in turn brought about inconsistency and contradiction in their deduction of Sharia precepts, which provoked further division (and confusion) within an already fragmented Muslim community.

It was in the gth century when mainstream Sunni-Muslim jurist-cum- theologians began to first conceive of a single systematic framework that could bring about consistency and agreement in the deduction of Sharia knowledge. The urgency of constructing a systematic framework was deemed paramount for two reasons. Firstly, since Sharia was accepted as having divine origin, whereby ordained Sharia precepts represented God's will for humankind, it was essential that contradictions between God's ordinances were resolved and minimised. The imperfection stemming from contradicting legal Sharia pre­cepts raised theological concerns over the perfectness (or the perfect nature) of God. Accordingly, the objective of creating a systematic framework not only had legal ramifications (of bringing about consistency in God's Sharia), but was also a theological exercise that had theological ramifications.3 Secondly, western commentators on Islamic law commonly suggest that the creation of a single systematic framework was deemed paramount as it ensured that the authority of Sharia, together with the authority of its promulgators and enforc­ers, was maintained across an expanded Muslim empire.4 Indeed, having con­sistent and uniform legal norms was a step towards ensuring a better regulated empire that could be smoothly governed.

The drive for creating a single consistent systematic framework witnessed the emergence of a distinct genre of literature called usul al-fiqh (literally, “the roots of understanding"), commonly glossed as the principles of Isla­mic jurisprudence or Islamic legal theory. In 1950, Joseph Schacht presented Muhammad Idris al-Shafi'! (d. 820) as having played a central and decisive role in the embryonic development of Islamic legal theory.5 Western scholarship on Islamic law after Schact continued to recognise Shafi'! as the founder or the ‘master architect' of Islamic legal theory. 6 His work, al-Risala, came to be

3 For works that describe how Usul al-fiqh was largely shaped by theology see Zysow, “Mu'tazilism and MaturIdism in Hanafl Legal Theory"; Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 1-5; Young, The Diaticch Forge: Juridical Disputation and the E٦^olt^t;i٢^n of Islamic Law, A91-5,SU Gleave, “Deriving Rules of Law, 66-67; - Reinhart, Before Revelation -.

4 See Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution ofIslamic Law, 203-4: Gleave, “Deriving Rules of Law," 57-60; - Calder, “Doubt and Prerogative -; Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 15.

5 Schacht, TheOriginsofIVIuhammat^anJurisprut^^ni^e, 1.-20.

6 For a comprehensive study on whether Shafi'! was the founder of usul al-fiqh see Hallaq, “Was al-Shafi'! the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?”; Makdisi, “The Juridical Theology of Shafi'!: Origins and Significance of Usfil al-fiqh”; Lowry, “Does Shafi'! have a Theory of Four Sources of Law?".

acknowledged as the first treaty on the discourse of legal theory that influenced the production of subsequent literature in the genre. Western scholarship commonly asserts that the principal contribution of Shfr in al-Risala was his innovative four-fold hierarchal categorisation of forms of evidence from which Sharia knowledge could be deduced. The four sources propounded by Shfrr included the Quran, tradition (sunna) of the Prophet, consensus (ijma^f) and analogical reasoning (qiyas), which Shafi'i used interchangeably with the term ijtihad.

The emergence and origins of legal theory as a distinct genre of Islamic sci­ences remains subject to ongoing research and academic scrutiny. Perhaps the most fitting explanation is given by Jonathan Brockopp, whose research on early Maliki scholars enables him to conclude that the seed of creating a single systematic framework of deducing Sharia knowledge may have been sown as early as the 8th century, but remained at a rudimentary level Nevertheless, it was Shafi'i's inchoate articulation of legal theory that gained significant trac­tion by the 10 th century, as many scholars produced works that were dedicated to commenting and criticising al-Risala. This period therefore witnessed the emergence of new literature on the study of legal theory. Authors of this genre, who were now generally recognised as Usulis, were jurists-cum-theologians who not only devoted their intellectual prowess to propose theories of how Sharia knowledge ought to be deduced or accessed, but also professed their

7 Hallaq, “Was al- Shafi'i the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?,” 588.

8 Lowry, “Does Shafi'i have a Theory of Four Sources of Law?," 45.

9 Brockopp, “Competing Theories," 4.

theological perspectives on pertinent theological questions, such as the nature and purpose of Sharia and the Divine Lawgiver.“ They developed a systematic framework that synthesised the role of revelation and reason.]] Although they admitted that reason played a major role in the discovery of Sharia knowledge, they tended to agree that it cannot transcend the injunctions of revelation. By generally accepting the four-fold hierarchal categorisation of Sharia evidence (Quran, sunna, Ijma', and qiyas), they thus managed to achieve a fine balance between the scope of human reasoning and a carefully categorised body of revealed texts. Moreover, since they accepted that human reason was depen­dent on revelation, Usulrs expended great effort in developing interpretive techniques or hermeneutical mechanisms that allowed them to consistently analyse every revelatory statement to gain a coherent understanding of the intent of the Divine Lawgiver.]2

By the middle of the 10th century, the major components of the Islamic dis­course of legal theory were crystallised and this went hand in hand with the consolidation of Sunni legal schools (madhahlb, singular. madhhab). Hallaq explains that a legal school refers to a cluster of individual jurists who are loyal to a distinct and collective legal doctrine in accordance with an established

10 For post-tenth century development of Sunni usul al-fiqh and its interrelationship with Heoffiogy see Zijsovi, The Economy of Certalnyi, *-ياً Haffiaq, The c^ι∙igir^ and Evolution of IslameTa-W, 12.8-32', Meffichert-, TheFormation of SunnlSchoolsof Law, 68-8⅛

11 A synthesis between reason and revelation was paramount in the pre-usUl al-fiqh schol­arly milieu, as two broadly distinctive camps of jurists existed; namely, the partisans of rational opinion (ahl al-ray) and the partisans of revelation (ahl al-hadlth).

24 For a thorough study of the Traditionalist theological doctrines see ibid., 263-80: also, for a study of the interplay between the Hanbali Legal School and Traditionalist theology see

1,,625-48.

25 Not all schools always agreed on what sources of law should be given preference to in the deduction of Sharia precepts, for instance Hanafi jurists displayed a preference for using istihsan (personal juristic preference), whereas the Maliki jurists displayed a preference for using istislah (social interest), see Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 120-46: Makdisi, “Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law": Kayadibi, Istihsan, 57-99.

26 See Jon Hoover, “Hanbali Theology".

27 See 1,, 225, Hughe Musiim Identtes, 1-9¾', Saeed, Islamic, 4¾7¾', Hahverson, Theology

andCreed inSunniIm,12¾¾', Brown, Hadtth, 180', Honranh, R^(iasc^nar^dTradi^tion, 9. relevant qualifications and legitimacy to speak on behalf of the Divine Lawgiver (or effectively, God). They possessed the aptitude and skillset to deduce Sharia precepts from a convincing systematic method that they them­selves created. Their ability to exert maximum effort in using reason within the stipulated boundaries of legal theory allowed them to credibly deduce Sharia knowledge and find sound solutions for legal issues encountered by a relatively large Muslim empire. Their intellectual prowess in systematising the Muslim legal discourse in the absence of the Prophet was perhaps the main factor that enabled them to command authority and obedience from the Muslim masses, whereby they became respected social leaders of the Muslim populace. Apart from the Muslim masses, their profound social influence was also recognised by elite ruling political authorities, who chose to patronise and promote the juristic brand of Islam, as it conceivably protected the stability of the Muslim empire. Devin Stewart, in Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, elucidates that the consoli­dation of the mainstream Sunni legal schools went hand in hand with jurists becoming recognised as the clerical class amongst Muslims. He accurately points out that since their consolidation up to the present day, legal schools (or the overall juristic discourse) continue to dominate the interpretation of Islam and Muslim intellectual cicles.28

It therefore becomes clear that the epistemological question of how God's Sharia (in both its broad and restricted usages) can be accessed or known in the absence of the charismatic Prophet Muhammad, has most convincingly been answered by the clerical class of jurists. Their production of a systematic framework of legal theory and their access to primary sources of Sharia knowl­edge enabled them to appropriately fill the gap left behind by the Prophet. This in turn led to the creation of Islamic legal orthodoxy. The opinions of scholars that operated outside the orthodox Sunni legal schools were immediately shut down and considered as being heretical, as they were based on non-stipulated methods. Instead, only opinions, or consensus, of clusters of jurists that oper­ated within recognised Sunni legal schools were deemed to hold authorita­tive value.29 As such, Stewart points out that groups such as the Shi'ites and Mu'tazilites had to struggle for survival in front of the force of Sunni legal orthodoxy, which he claims, “became a structural or institutional feature of Islamic societies that would remain in force and indeed change very little until the twentieth century.''30

28 See Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy, 15.

29 1,,65,.

30 1.,6¢..

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