Introduction

Agazzi’s philosophy of science takes its roots in two different traditions of thought: Aristotelian and scholastic realism, which he learned mainly from Gustavo Bontadini; and neopositivistic epistemology, characterized by empiri­cism and operationalism, which was still the dominant view when he graduated, and with which he later interacted through Ludovico Geymonat and his research

M.

Department of Basic Sciences and Foundations, University of Urbino “Carlo Bo”, via Timoteo Viti 10, 61029 Urbino, Italy

e-mail: mario.alai@libero.it

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 45

M. Alai et al. (eds.), Science Between Truth and Ethical Responsibility,

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-16369-7_4 enterprises. What is more important, he has succeeded in synthesizing the best aspects of both approaches.

From the former tradition, he draws the idea that reality is the object of scientific research, and truth is it goal; thus he is able to check both the risk of antirealism inherent in logical empiricism, and the relativism of some early anti- positivistic reactions. From the scholastic approach he also developed his pecu­liar conception of scientific objectivity, the keystone of his thought, according to which science deals always with formal objects, in some measure selected, abstracted and structured by us. This distinguishes him from various forms of naive or uncritical realism. To be sure, this is also the main tenet of Kantism and subsequent forms of constructivism; but unlike those philosophies, in Agazzi it does not lead to subjectivism and antirealism, thank to the robust objectivist and realist bases of his thought.

From neopositivism Agazzi derives two insights: an uncompromising empiricism, as a safeguard against any rationalist metaphysics; and the awareness that our cogni­tive approach to reality is at bottom practical or operational, hence direct. Thus he avoids the epistemological dualism and the ensuing antirealism which has character­ized much modern philosophy, empiricism in particular. In fact, in spite of his fre­quent warnings that rational argumentation must complement experience as a source of our knowledge, at some crucial passages of his complex exposition the neoposi­tivistic legacy seems to prevail, and the balance of Agazzi’s thought appears to be slightly tilted on the empirical-operational side. But this, I shall point out, may have consequences which contradict his own avowed realism and objectivism.

Thanks to the happy circumstance of the publication, this year, of a long waited-for volume which draws together into a vast and coherent picture Agazzi’s teachings in epistemology and philosophy of science over many years, a real summa of his philosophy (Agazzi 2014), I shall be able to carry out my exposition and comments exclusively with reference to it.

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