The American occupation of Japan

On 2 September 1945 Japan signed the official document of surrender ending the Pacific War in a ceremony led by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP, an acronym also given to the occupying bureaucracy under his control).

Article 9

Article in the Japanese Constitution of 1947 barring the country from going to war and possessing armed forces. Later interpreted to mean that Japan still had the right to self­defence and could maintain armed forces designed with that purpose in mind.

reverse course

The change of emphasis from democratization to economic reconstruction that the United States introduced in its occupation of Japan, 1947-49.

The American occupation of Japan can be divided into two distinct eras. From 1945 to 1947 SCAP concentrated on establishing democracy and pluralism. In pursuit of these goals it encouraged the growth of the labour movement, enfranchised women and engaged in an extensive agricultural reform policy to eradicate land tenancy, which was seen as having contributed to the rise of ultra­nationalism in the 1930s. In addition, many of those associated with militarism were either put on trial or purged from public life. This affected former army and navy personnel and some right-wing politicians, but in a spirit of conservative pragmatism was not applied to the royal family or to the bureaucrats and industrialists needed to run the country.

By 1948 this ‘liberal’ phase of the occupation had run its course, for in that year, in what is referred to as the ‘reverse course’, the United States began to change tack and stress instead the need for economic recovery and eventually rearmament. This transformation in occupation policy was caused by a number

of concerns, such as the need to re-establish Japan as a key player in the world economy, and the fear that continued economic dislocation would encourage the growth of communism. In order to create a stronger economy, SCAP introduced in 1949 a policy of financial austerity, designed to curb government expenditure, reduce inflation and encourage the growth of the export sector by giving it preferential access to raw materials and foreign currency earnings. Significantly for the future it also pegged the yen at the competitive exchange rate of ¥360 to $1. Assisting SCAP in its new policy was the government of Shigeru Yoshida, which came to office in October 1948. Yoshida was a former diplomat of marked anti-communist views. Like many of the Japanese conservative elite, he felt that the ‘liberal’ period in the occupation had gone too far, and he welcomed the ‘reverse course’ with its emphasis on building for prosperity and reining in the Japanese Left. In addition, Yoshida was keen to co-operate because he believed that the rapid re-establishment of economic and social stability would help lead to the end of the occupation.

see Chapter 10

By 1951 Washington decided that the time had come to bring the occupation to a conclusion. Accordingly, in September a peace treaty was signed at an international conference in San Francisco, which stated that Japan would regain its full sovereignty in April 1952.

At the same time as this rather bland document was signed into international law, another treaty was also being concluded — a security pact between Japan and the United States. This controversial treaty has been at the centre of Japanese foreign and security policy ever since, and is therefore worth studying in some detail. During the first part of the ‘reverse course’ security had not been an important issue; indeed, in the late 1940s most American policy-makers were content to see Japan as a neutral, demilitarized state in line with the constitution. However, by 1951 the Korean War meant that this was no longer deemed to be a feasible option. Instead, American policy-makers believed that if Japan was again to become a sovereign state it must rearm and join the Western alliance system. It might be thought that the Japanese conservative elite would have greeted this complete reversal in American policy with great satisfaction, for the ban on possessing armed forces was a humiliating reminder of Japan’s defeat and its new lowly status. However, while Yoshida was desperate to win back Japan’s inde­pendence, he was in fact loath to rearm. He feared that military expenditure would direct scarce economic resources away from domestic growth, and felt that both politically and socially it was too early to contemplate the revival of those elements that had plunged Japan into the disastrous Pacific War. He therefore sought in his talks with the Americans in 1951 to place Japan under America’s protection, but to avoid having to reconstruct its armed forces.

People's Republic of China (PRC)

The official name of communist or mainland China. The PRC came into existence in 1949 under the leadership of Mao Zedong.

American commentators in the 1980s frequently argued that Yoshida successfully achieved his goal, for the Security Treaty did not commit Japan to full­scale rearmament. This, it has been contended, laid the foundations for what is referred to as the ‘free ride', in which Japan, liberated from the burden of paying for its own defence, was able to concentrate on generating economic growth under an American security umbrella. However, the reality of the situation was that Yoshida's refusal to contemplate full rearmament cost Japan dearly in the short term. Unable to rely on the Japanese to protect themselves, the United States decided to use the Security Treaty to turn its bases in Japan into a bastion for the defence of East Asia, even if this compromised Japanese sovereignty. Accordingly, under the conditions of the treaty, Washington won the right to use bases in Japan for regional defence without having to consult the Japanese government. In addition, in a separate administrative agreement signed in February 1952, American forces in Japan were given virtually extra-territorial rights. Moreover, in the wake of the San Francisco conference, Washington acted to limit Japan's diplomatic freedom of movement by making it clear that Congress would not ratify the peace treaty unless Japan opened relations with Jiang Jieshi's government on Taiwan rather than with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This was a bitter blow for Japan, which traditionally had close commercial ties with mainland China, but under American pressure it had no choice but to comply.

Thus, as the occupation came to an end, Japan was already heavily influenced by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Its economic revival was being sponsored by Washington in order to assist with the stabilization of Asia and to forestall the growth of communism in Japan, while strategically and politically it was locked into the Western alliance system as a distinctly unequal partner. The question for Japan as it regained its independence was whether it was content to remain in this subordinate position and take advantage of America's interest in its stability and growth, or whether it should seek to improve its position and gain greater flexibility and equality of status.