While much is made of the importance of ideology, most notably Confucianism, in enabling the Chinese imperial order to endure for over two millenia,

more recently scholars have highlighted the equal importance of military power, or state-sponsored/sanctioned violence, in maintaining and extending the empire's borders. The three centuries from 1500 to 1800 are among the most significant militarily in the long history of imperial China.

Spanning parts of the Ming and Qing dynasties, these centuries were notable for the widespread adoption of gunpowder weapons, the successful defence of the Asian mainland against the Japanese invasion of the 1590s, the massive peasant rebellions and Manchu invasion that overthrew the native Ming dynasty, and the steady expansion of territory under succeeding Manchu Qing rulers that ended the age-old steppe threat to the Chinese empire and established most of what remain the modern borders of the People's Republic of China. At the same time the Ming and Qing Empires were confronted with a dizzying array of domestic challenges ranging from uprisings by minority peoples along the frontiers to challenges from imperial princes, to sectarian insurrections to outbreaks of piracy along the south-east coast. Indeed, Sun Laichen has called the period from 1550 to 1683 the most warlike in the long history of East Asia.^{^[187]}

Recent scholarship on various aspects of Chinese warfare highlights the broader role of state-sponsored violence in maintaining imperial authority at home and abroad. It also draws our attention to a surprising level of local violence embedded within Chinese society. Sectarians, bandits, pirates and martial arts associations, among others, routinely used violence to achieve desired outcomes and the imperial state responded in kind.

Indeed, a re-examination of Chinese ways of war accentuates the roles played by violence in maintaining and extending the power of the imperial state in Asia. For while Enlightenment European philosophers might have cast China as an idealised philosopher kingdom and praised its bureaucracy and apparent lack of violence in contrast to contemporary Europe, in fact early modern China was also a violent place and legitimacy and authority were maintained by the sword more so than Confucian platitudes about benevolent governance.^{^[188]} And while the ways ‘just wars' were framed and articulated differed from their European counterparts, it is obvious that the late imperial Chinese state, building upon centuries of military developments and statecraft traditions, was equally concerned about monopolising violence in the interest of extending its authority and territorial control.^{^[189]}

Recent scholarship on this era has highlighted the martial orientation of China, casting aside the aforementioned presumption of civil (wen) dominance over the military (wu) aspects of Chinese society and culture. Joanna Waley-Cohen contends that ‘an intense focus on military affairs' was one of the Qing state's most distinctive characteristics.^{^[190]} She further argues that the Qing witnessed a steady militarisation of culture and perpetuation of martial values that was unprecedented in Chinese history.

David Robinson highlights the ‘martial spectacles' of the Ming court that were carried over from the preceding Mongol Yuan (1279-1368) dynasty.^{^[191]} Such studies draw our attention to the centrality of warfare and violence in late imperial Chinese culture and remind us that these were both empires beset by foreign and domestic challenges that necessitated military flexibility and adaptability. The sheer number and scope of military operations suggests that violence was a way of life and an everyday reality for many people despite governmental efforts to create a veneer of civility. In fact, it was the government's ability to overawe its subjects that often proved crucial in maintaining order.

In considering Chinese ways of war one must begin with the realisation that the Ming and Qing Empires were incredibly ethnically and geographically diverse and their militaries were forced to deal with a range of strategic problems that far exceeded those of many of their contemporaries, with the possible exception of the Ottomans. That the Ming and Qing states were able to handle these problems and develop new solutions to them is a testament to the military might and innovation of the empire and warrants far greater attention from students of both Chinese and comparative military history. This chapter presents an overview of Chinese ways of war and addresses the relationship between warfare and violence in early modern China. By presenting a generally chronological approach to the way these dynasties managed their military challenges one can appreciate the interplay of traditional practices and new innovations that allowed these empires to be among the most successful in the world while also seeing how they deployed violence to maintain their authority.

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Source: Antony Robert, Carroll Stuart, Pennock Caroline D. (eds.). The Cambridge World History of Violence. Volume 3: AD 1500-AD 1800. Cambridge University Press,2020. — 710 p.. 2020

While much is made of the importance of ideology, most notably Confucianism, in enabling the Chinese imperial order to endure for over two millenia,

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