Ur III Empire

3.1. Introductory Notes

The Ur III Dynasty ruled over Babylonia for slightly over one century (2112-2004 bce). It numbered five rulers in five generations: Ur-Namma, his son Sulgi, the latter's son Amar-Suen, Amar-Suen's son Su-Suen, and Su-Suen's son Ibbi-Suen.

3.2. Ur-Namma: The Founder of the Ur III State

Ur-Namma (2112-2095), who probably was Utu-hegal's brother, began his career as the latter's general of Ur. Although the relevant historical data are exceedingly sparse, the following course of events may plausibly be reconstructed. Upon Utu- hegal's death Ur-Namma assumed control of Uruk, crowning himself subsequently as the king of Ur. He then began expanding his power over the rest of southern Babylonia, bringing most of its city-states under his rule. The notable exception here was the state of Lagas, which was annexed only at the very end of Ur-Namma's reign.

It appears that Ur-Namma's next step was to dislodge Puzur-Insusinak from northern Babylonia and the Diyala Region.^[144] These operations also included campaigns in the Susiana,^[145] and probably still further to the east, in the land of Ansan (modern Fars), where Puzur-Insusinak's original homeland seems to have been situated. As a result of these campaigns, which appear to have involved the active participation of Gudea of Lagas, Puzur-Insusinak's “empire” was completely annihilated and divided up by Ur-Namma and Gudea.

With the subsequent annexation of the city-state of Lagas and its recently ac­quired territories in the east, by the end of Ur-Namma's reign the Ur III state embraced the whole of Babylonia, a significant foreign territory along Babylonia's eastern flank (the Susiana and AdamDUN), and likely the Diyala Region (or at least some of its parts). That Ur-Namma held effective sway over northern Babylonia is confirmed by the so-called Cadaster of Ur-Namma (see following discussion) and his title of “king of Sumer and Akkad,” which had been coined precisely in reflection Babylonia’s unification. But his hold of the border territories may have remained uncertain, since literary sources of later date allude to Ur-Namma’s struggles with the “Gutians” (where “Gutian” is a literary trope for the eastern highland enemy).

Apart from his successful unifying schemes, Ur-Namma’s was also responsible for laying the foundations of Babylonia’s political and economic organization. As shown by his “Cadaster,”^[146] which offers a detailed description of the borders of the provinces throughout Babylonia, assigning those territories to the chief deities of those provinces, Ur-Namma had reorganized Babylonia politically, turning the earlier city-states into provinces, and introducing a uniform administrative system for the entire state. It is possible that he had also begun to transform Babylonia’s ec­onomic organization, a task that was to be completed by his son Sulgi.

Among Ur-Namma’s other accomplishments as a consolidator was a reform of weights and measures, as well as the promulgation, for the first time in history, as far as we know, of an extensive and thematically arranged collation of laws.^[147]

Ur-Namma may also have been responsible for some of the basic tenets of Ur III foreign policy, in particular, the concept of strategic external alliances that was later one of the foundations of Ur III imperial strategy.

3.3. Sulgi: The Ur III State Becomes an Empire

3.3.1. Period of Domestic Reforms

Whatever Ur-Namma’s exact contributions toward the creation of the Ur III state may have been, it is indisputable that its true builder was Sulgi, Ur-Namma’s son and successor (2094-2047). And it is Sulgi alone to whom belongs the credit of turning that state into a venture that, as argued earlier, deserves to be called an empire—if not in terms of its physical dimensions, at least as far as its ambitions are concerned.

Although Sulgi appears to have been an exceptionally gifted individual, it was probably the extraordinary length of his reign (48 years) that, as in the case of Naram-Suen, was mainly responsible for his political success. As shown by the his­tory of his reign, only the tenure of that duration would have been sufficient to im­plement a political program of similar ambition and complexity.

The events of the first two decades of Sulgi’s reign are poorly known. As far as one can tell, it was a time of internal consolidation, which served to lay the foundations for the program of dramatic transformations to come. Those years also saw the development of a foreign policy aiming at limited territorial expansion in the pe­riphery, as well as the first attempts to implement it.

Around Sulgi’s twentieth regnal year there began a period of reforms that were to affect every aspect of Babylonia’s political institutions and its social and eco­nomic organization. In view of their highly coordinated character, and since they were implemented during a relatively brief period of time, one suspects that these reforms were carried out according to a specific blueprint. As a result of these reforms, which took some 10 years to complete, Babylonia was transformed into a highly centralized patrimonial state.^[148] Structured as a pyramid, and comprising a hierarchy of individual households, this state constituted one vast royal domain.

The fact that the king was now the owner of all arable land^[149] made it possible for the crown fundamentally to reorganize Babylonia’s economic and administrative system. Within individual provinces of Babylonia, which, in terms of their size and geographic extent, corresponded quite closely to the earlier city-states, the fields and other forms of rural holdings originally owned by the chief deities of those principalities (temple estates) were significantly reduced in size and put under the management of provincial governors (ensi) who, though usually stemming from local elites, were royal appointees. These “institutional economies,” as they are com­monly referred to by Assyriologists, constituted for all practical purposes fiefdoms, which were granted to the governors on the condition of supplying to the crown ca. 50 percent of their agricultural income, as well as various other forms of eco­nomic contributions (mainly physical labor) that were meant to support a variety of state-run operations, such as military expeditions, corvee works and building projects of national importance, and the maintenance of the chief administrative and religious centers of the state. These manifold contributions were paid according to a rotational system (called bala, “turn”), which prescribed that each province would be responsible for the upkeep of the state and its operations during a specific timeperiod, whose length was determined by the given province’s size and eco­nomic capabilities.^[150]

The remaining portions of the agricultural holdings formerly belonging to the temples were used by the crown to create a new fund of land, which was managed directly by the state’s royal officialdom.

As a result of these developments, Babylonia acquired a two-part type of in­ternal organization, in that within each province there now existed two economic and administrative entities essentially quite independent of each other: the do­main of the province’s governor (the so-called “institutional economy”), which was a remnant of the original temple estates; and the holdings and settlements ei­ther confiscated from temple estates or newly developed by the crown, which were governed by the highest military officials residing in a given province (sagina, “general,” and nu-banda3, “colonel”). The latter entity, which may conveniently be termed “royal economy,” constituted the power-base of the crown, at the same time counterbalancing the position of the governor and providing an important check on his powers.

For the state to handle the revenues incoming from the provincial “institutional economies” (the bala taxes) and those paid by the various constituent parts of the “royal economy,” an efficient collecting mechanism was required. To this end, to­ward the close of the third decade of Sulgi’s reign a huge complex of storage facilities, offices, and industrial units, called Puzris-Dagan, was built in the neighborhood of Nippur, the religious capital of Babylonia. This localization was due primarily to logistical considerations, since Nippur, lying on the border between Sumer and Akkad, represented Babylonia’s geographic midpoint, and therefore a perfect locus for a national collecting and re-distribution center.

Only a couple of years before Puzris-Dagan became operational, Sulgi had built, just to the south of it, at the religious center of Tummal, a new royal palace.^[151] The physical proximity of this palace to Puzris-Dagan, combined with the fact that it was constructed at roughly the same time, strongly indicates that these two projects were but parts of the same grand undertaking, whose objective was to provide the state with a centrally located nerve center. Since Tummal was later regularly visited by the royal family and the highest officials of the realm (such as the sukkal-mah, “chancellor”), it was perhaps at Tummal and Puzris-Dagan—rather than at Ur— that most of the state business was conducted, and where the government’s most important departments, such as the war and foreign offices, were situated.

The bala taxation system, which imposed on Babylonian provinces specific pro­portional quotas of material and labor contributions, necessitated that each “insti­tutional economy” keep close track of all the expenditures it made to the state during a given year, in order to be able to calculate the outstanding balance of its yearly tax obligation. This requirement resulted in the production of an unprecedented volume of administrative records, taking mainly the form of receipts and various types of economic forecasts. This explosion of records began suddenly and in full force around Sulgi’s thirtieth regnal year, confirming that this phenomenon was a direct outcome of the introduction of the bala taxation system and of the creation of a centralized economic system more generally.^[152] Indeed, it may be conjectured that if not for the uniquely high level of Ur III centralization—and particularly because of the bala system—this great profusion of administrative documents, which is so characteristic of Ur III times, would never have taken place.

A striking feature of this documentation is the appearance of new types of records, reflecting novel accounting procedures. This documentation is equally notable for its uniform script, technical terminology, and the standardized tablet shapes. These facts make it clear that a massive program of scribal education must have been carried out as part of Sulgi’s reforms, the purpose of which was to provide Babylonia with an army of uniformly trained administrators. There are reasons to think that the training program in question was centralized, but neither the loca­tion nor the specifics of this undertaking are known.

As can be seen from the preceding description, the Ur III political and eco­nomic organization diverged from the Sargonic model primarily in that it imposed the southern institution of city-states—now turned into provinces—on northern Babylonia. It also eliminated private ownership of arable land (which had become common throughout Babylonia in Sargonic times), making all such holdings the property of the king. On the other hand, it retained many of the Sargonic innovations, such as a standing army and various other central institutions and mechanisms, and the practice of granting subsistence fields to the state’s dependents in exchange for services.

3.3.2. Ideological Foundations of the Ur III State

A similar mixture of the old and new can be discerned in Ur III ideology.^[153] Ostensibly, the Ur III state represented an avowed return to the Early Dynastic “true Sumerian” values, especially as far as its kingship was concerned, which pretended to revive the model of a divinely selected priest-king. Quite characteristically, the Ur III dynasts distanced themselves from Akkade and her rulers, tracing their ideo­logical and political descent instead to the mythical kings of Uruk, such as Gilgames and Lugalbanda. In accordance with this general trend, southern religion and cul­ture now became the focus of the state, and Sumerian assumed the status of the of­ficial language (in spite of the fact that, even in southern Babylonia, Akkadian was becoming the dominant spoken idiom).

In reality, however, the Ur III kingship was deeply impacted by the Sargonic one. Rather than behaving like the weak and self-deprecating Sumerian priest-kings of yore, Ur-Namma and his followers carried on like absolute rulers in Naram-Suens mold. Therefore, in accepting the legendary Uruk rulers as their models, the Ur III kings seemed actually to be saying the following: if we look and act like the Sargonic kings it is only because we are directly descended from Gilgames, who had been a ruler of this type long before Sargon appeared on the scene.

Similarly, the House of Ur was all about descent and kinship relations, in which, of course, it followed the Sargonic example. In fact, the Ur III kings outdid their Sargonic predecessors in that area, since their state was, for all practical purposes, a family affair, in that, like in the modern House of Saud, nearly everybody of impor­tance in Ur III society was related by blood to the royal family.

Most remarkable of all is the fact that the Ur III kingship managed to com­bine the principle of divine selection with the idea of king's divinity.^[154] This devel­opment, which clearly formed part of Sulgi's political and economic reforms, can roughly be dated to his twentieth regnal year, when the king elevated himself to the divine plane. In deifying himself, Sulgi undoubtedly drew on Naram-Suens ex­ample, since, as in the latter's case, the main obstacle to his unifying schemes was the “southern question” (see section 2.2). But, drawing lessons from Naram-Suens precedent, Sulgi instituted his deification in a much more measured and diplomatic way. Rather than becoming the god of a specific city-state, and thus claiming the ownership of a specific territory, Sulgi assumed the title of the vague and inoffen­sive “god of the land.” Moreover, he cleverly embedded himself within the divine families of all the southern city-states, thereby legitimizing his claim to their in­dividual kingships. There are indications that Sulgi and his followers were accord­ingly required to undergo separate coronations in each of the southern capitals.

3.3.3. The Ur III Foreign Policy and the Birth of the Imperial Design

Like its kingship, the foreign policy of the Ur III state too bore a strong Sargonic imprint. There is no doubt that it was the Sargonic Empire that provided direct inspiration and example for the imperial designs of the Ur III rulers. At the same time, however, the creation of Sulgi and his successors was in many ways a critical reaction against the empire of Sargon and Naram-Suen. Thus, while adopting the objectives and many of the solutions of its predecessor, the Ur III construct was to a large extent a conscious effort to avoid the Sargonic mistakes. One might even say that it was the lessons of the Sargonic failure that were primarily responsible for the shape and character of the empire of Sulgi and his successors.

While abandoning the idea of large-scale foreign conquests, and settling instead for a compact, highly centralized native state with a ribbon of defensive periphery, the Ur III kings still aimed at political and economic domination of much of the ter­ritories previously impacted by the Sargonic expansion. Rather than by wars, those objectives were to be achieved by diplomacy and mutually beneficial economic exchanges with other powers. The result was an exquisitely designed self-limiting— and largely defensive—imperial strategy.^[155] Although it is possible that the basic outlines of the Ur III imperial design originated already under Ur-Namma, it is certain that it was only during the reign of Sulgi that this design acquired its full form. As far as it can be ascertained, the main objective of this design was to se­cure for Babylonia direct access to the natural resources not available locally, such as metals, stone, and timber, and, much more importantly, to establish Babylonian domination over the key trade routes between east and west, all the way from the Iranian highlands to the Mediterranean. Among those routes, of particular impor­tance were the ones leading to the sources of tin, a metal of immense strategic value during the Bronze Age. Those sources were possibly located in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where ancient tin mines dating to the following (Old Babylonia) period have been found. Other sources of tin appear to have been located in Afghanistan. Given the high visibility of the tin trade in Old Babylonian times, when the spec­tacular rise of the so-called sukkal-mah dynasty on the Iranian plateau is at least partially attributable to its ability to control the key overland trade routes between east and west, such as the Great Khurasan Road, it is reasonable to conjecture that those commercial patterns were in place already in Ur III times, and that it was the tin trade specifically that Sulgi and his followers tried to exploit.^[156]

Sulgi's plan of bringing the east-west trade routes under his control called for a limited and highly selective territorial expansion, which aimed at the conquest of only those territories that offered direct access to and were indispensable for the continued control of those routes. The lands in question formed a long belt extending along the left bank of the Tigris, from Urbilum (Erbil), Arraphum (Kirkuk), and Sasrum (Tell Shemshara on the Raniyah plain) in the north­west to Huhnuri (the area of Tappeh Bormi near Ramhormoz) in the southeast. Characteristically—and in dramatic contrast with the Sargonic Empire—neither the reign of Sulgi nor those of his successors showed any attempts at territorial ex­pansion toward the west (northern Syria, the Mediterranean coast, and Anatolia) or into Upper Mesopotamia.

The foundation of the Ur III imperial design—or its “Grand Strategy,” as it may aptly be called—were political and economic alliances with the international

powers of particular strategic importance to Ur. Those powers were Marhasi, Ansan, Mari, and Simanum. By forming these four alliances, Sulgi created a co­herent international order, in which the entire territory between eastern Iran and northern Syria was divided into clearly defined spheres of interest. Since at least three of these alliances date to before the Ur III territorial expansion really took off, they had clearly been designed as a strategic framework for launching the expan­sion itself.

In the east, the partners of Ur were Marhasi (Kerman) and Ansan (Tell Malyan in Fars), both relationships being cemented by dynastic marriages, which took place in years Sulgi 18 and Sulgi 30, respectively. The alliance with Marhasi proved to be exceedingly firm and enduring, since it lasted without any apparent interruptions into the reign of Ibbi-Suen.

In the west, the strategic ally of Ur was Mari. In this relationship, which had been established already under Ur-Namma, and which was particularly close and cor­dial, Mari seems to have been ceded complete sway of the Euphrates Valley north of Sippar and of northwestern Upper Mesopotamia, especially the Khabur triangle. In return, Mari protected and policed for Babylonia its western borders. It may be surmised that Mari and Ur were also linked by a major trading arrangement, by virtue of which eastern products, such as tin and lapis lazuli, were trans-shipped via Mari to the Mediterranean.

A similar arrangement appears to have operated in the north, where the strategic partner of Ur likely was the kingdom of Simanum. Although its precise location remains unknown, Simanum may confidently be sought in the upper reaches of the Tigris, possibly in the general area of Mardin. It is likely that Simanum’s par­ticular role was to protect Babylonia’s northern flank, and to keep in check the var­ious vassal states that intervened between the two powers (such as Nineveh and Hamazi).

As for the main strategic challenges to Sulgi’s plans, the most immediate ob­stacle was presented by the Zagros countries of Simurrum (upper reaches of the Diyala river) and Lullubum (region of Sullamaniyah), which blocked Babylonia’s access to Kimas and Humurti, the two key points in charge of the Great Khurasan Road.⁴¹ For the “Grand Strategy” to succeed, Simurrum and Lullubum had to be conquered first.

From the long-term perspective, the chief challenge to those plans was the ascendance of the Simaskian principalities on the Iranian plateau. These principalities, at least 20 in number, dotted the Zagros all the way from the Caspian Sea in the northwest to the borders of Ansan in the southeast. Another such obstacle was the semi-nomadic Amorite tribes, which established themselves in a piedmont zone along the Zagros, within which they moved their herds back and forth ac­cording to the changing seasons, and from where they raided adjacent territories. This zone—or the “Amorite country,” as it was known to the Babylonians—extended

from Jebel Hamrin to the Susiana, roughly parallel to the Simaskian settlement. Both the Simaskians and the Amorites presented a direct threat to the Babylonian interests in the Zagros.

3.3.4. Sulgi’s Conquests in the Periphery and the Creation of the Empire

Sulgi’s foreign wars commenced with operations against Der (modern Badrah), an immensely important strategic point in charge of the roads leading toward the Zagros passes. The task of capturing Der was not easy, since it took Sulgi as many as seventeen years (years Sulgi 5-21), and at least two campaigns, to accomplish this objective.

Sulgi turned his attention then to Simurrum and Lullubum, the two main re­gional powers blocking his access to the Great Khurasan Road. Simurrum and Lullubum proved to be even tougher opponents than Der, since the war on them, which involved more than 10 separate campaigns, was to last the next 22 years (years Sulgi 24- 45). The first stage of this war (years Sulgi 24-41) met with only limited success. It appears that Sulgi then revised his strategy, widening the the­ater of his operations to the north and northeast, to capture the lands of Urbilum, Arraphum, and Sasrum—which were allied with Simurrum and Lullubum—and thereby to establish there a foothold for operations against his two adversaries. As a result of this encircling maneuver, which took four years to complete (years Sulgi 42-45), Simurrum and Lullubum were finally brought to submission.

With Simurrum and Lullubum out of the picture, and the whole trans-Tigridian region safely in Babylonian hands, Sulgi was free at last to accomplish his paramount military objective. Just one year later he launched an expedition against Kimas and Humurti, the two key mountainous points in charge of the Great Khurasan Road along its stretch between Shahabad and Kermanshah. The conquest of Kimas and Humurti, which took three years (years Sulgi 45-48), and which was the crowning achievement of Sulgi’s reign, finally established Babylonia’s control over the main trade routes between east and west.^[157]

The difficulties Sulgi encountered with the conquest of Simurrum and Lullubum apparently convinced him of the need to provide the northeastern flank of Babylonia with a forward security system. For this purpose, a belt of defensive settlements was established in the conquered periphery.^[158] Extending from Urbilum in the north to Pasime (Tell Abu Shiija near Amarah) in the south, and running par­allel to the Tigris and the Zagros ranges, this belt formed a defensive buffer, whose function was to ensure stability throughout the region, and to protect trade routes from Simaskian and Amorite intrusions. The constituents of this belt, which was in many ways an equivalent of the Roman limes, were essentially military colonies, settled with a mixture of local and Babylonian populations. The colons so estab­lished were put under the control of the central military organization, according to the principles governing the “royal economy” in Babylonia. In this way, the colons were provided with subsistence fields, for which they were required to pay a tax, called gun₂ ma-da, “tax of the periphery.” Assessed according to the payer's military rank, and paid in the form of cattle, sheep, and goats, this tax was delivered either to the collection center of Puzris-Dagan or one of its subsidiary branches, such as are known to have existed in Esnuna, Susa, Ur, and Uruk.

An important element of this defensive system was the chain of fortifications called the “Wall of the Periphery” (Bad3-ma-da), which protected communica­tion lines in the Diyala Region, in particular, the critical passes in the Jebel Hamrin range. Constructed already in year Sulgi 36—without any doubt as part of the war on Simurrum and Lullubum—these fortifications evidently were built in prepara­tion for and as the founding block of the security program just described.

Already during Sulgi's reign, the Ur III state also began systematically to bring into vassal relationship the independent neighbors of its periphery. As a result of this policy, which reached fruition during the reign of Sulgi's successor Amar- Suen, a secondary protective barrier was established along Babylonia's northeastern border. These new vassals, who were required to swear an oath of allegiance to the king of Ur, to pay tribute, and to provide the Ur III state with soldiery, were held in obedience not only by the Ur III military presence in the periphery, but equally by the alert supervision of the strategic allies of the Ur III state, Marhasi, Ansan, Mari, and Simanum. The relationships with those vassal states were cemented by the rou­tine practice of supplying their rulers with Sumerian princesses as wives. The off­spring of such unions were often required to reside in Babylonia, further to ensure the loyalty of their fathers.

The fruit of all these developments was an imperial construct of remarkable com­plexity and intricacy. While much smaller than the Sargonic Empire territorially, the Ur III Empire was much more closely integrated politically and economically. It was also more sophisticated in terms of its organization and the ways in which it operated. It may further be conjectured that, during the three decades of its effec­tive existence (year Sulgi 40 through year Ibbi-Suen 3), it was also more successful as an economic venture, even though most of its income probably came from trade, rather than from direct exploitation of the conquered territories.

3.4. Amar-Suen: Imperial Consolidation

Although it has been speculated that Sulgi was assassinated in a palace revolution, he more likely died of old age. But there may have been a period of trouble following his death, since his successor (and son) Amar-Suen (2046-2037) in all likelihood was not the designated heir. This may be gathered from the fact that Amar-Suen's name is inexplicably missing in the vast documentation from Sulgi's reign. This omission further suggests that he was during that time in exile, possibly at Mari, since he is generally believed to have been the son of the Mari princess Taram-Uram

(see section 3.2). If so, one would have to assume that his accession to the throne was a result of Mari's direct intervention into the Babylonian succession.

The reign of Amar-Suen saw no new territorial conquests. Although he sent expeditions against Sulgi's enemies Urbilum and Sasrum, those assuredly were but policing operations. The same apparently was true also of the campaign against Huhnuri, a vital point in control of the route to Ansan and Marhasi. Since there is no indication that Huhnuri later formed part of the empire, this operation too was probably meant to punish a disobedient vassal.

Amar-S uen's reign otherwise was a period of consolidation, both within Babylonia and within its periphery. In Babylonia, during this “Pax Babyloniaca” of sorts, an ambitious program of agricultural development and new settlement was implemented, and various new national building projects, such as the construc­tion of the religious center at Ga'es near Ur,⁴⁴ were carried out. In the periphery, the system of military colonies founded by Sulgi was fully put in place. It was also during this time that the intricate network of strategic and vassal relationships, on which the empire depended for much of its security, acquired its most complete form. As a consequence, during that time Babylonia saw an unusually high volume of diplomatic contacts and international exchanges. For all these reasons, Amar- Suen's reign may justly be considered the highest point of the empire's history.

3.5. The Empire and Its Institutions

As is typical of patrimonial systems, in the Ur III Empire political power rested with the king, who was both its ultimate source and its exclusive possessor. The king dispensed this power through a hierarchy of royal dependents, at whose top stood his extended family. The royal princes and the king's sons-in-laws held some of the top positions in the empire's military forces, at the same time controlling vast eco­nomic resources, in the form of rural estates that had been granted to them by the king on the right of usufruct. Other princes and princesses occupied many of the most important priestly offices. Queens too wielded much power, mainly through harem politicking and their ability to influence the king directly, but also through their extensive—and largely independent—e conomic activities. While all this necessitated some power sharing with his innumerable kin, the actual decision­making and the daily running of the state were exclusive prerogatives of the king. Such at least was the situation during the reign of Sulgi, since subsequent to it the reality appears to have been considerably different (see the following).

After the king, the most important official of the realm—and in fact the only such functionary of significance—was the chancellor (sukkal-mah). The office of the chancellor acquired particular importance after Sulgi's death, when it combined all the powers related to the army, the conduct of foreign relations, and probably

the running of Babylonia's “royal economy” as well. This development was due to the political rise of Aradmu (also known as Arad-Nanna). This individual became chancellor as early as year Sulgi 45 (if not earlier). Being related to the royal family by marriage, he appears to have become Sulgi's close advisor and confidant, and, upon the latter's death, the executor of Sulgi's political testament and the true heir to the “Grand Strategy.” There are strong reasons to think that during the following two reigns, and well into the reign of Ibbi-Suen, Aradmu was the de facto ruler of the empire. This is indicated by the fact that in the records extant the king is prac­tically invisible in the running of the government, his active role being confined to his various cultic capacities. As we shall see later, toward the end of Su-Suen's reign, Aradmu became the virtual viceroy of the empire's periphery. But, whatever the precise extent of Aradmu's extraordinary powers may have been, it is indisputable that he was the empire's most towering figure, and a crucial factor in the later his­tory of the period.

The single most important institution of the state was the army and the eco­nomic resources it controlled (the so-called “royal economy”), both in Babylonia and in the periphery. The army's generals and colonels, who numbered in the hun­dreds, formed as a group a reservoir of great political power. Many of the generals were princes or were related to the king by marriage. Equally notable was the great profusion among the higher ranks of the military of foreigners, mostly Elamites, Hurrians, and Amorites, but also members of various other ethnic groups. This internationalization of the central institutions, and the openness of the empire to outsiders, counted among the most characteristic features of the empire.

Not only the officerial ranks, but also the troops themselves, comprised great numbers of foreigners. In fact, it was the Elamite and Amorite detachments that appear to have formed the core of the shock troops used in offensive operations. These foreign soldiers were also routinely employed to protect the king and his family.

Precise data on the size of Ur III armies are lacking. However, the fact that the state was able to raise up to 22,000 men to work on a single public project ^[159] suggests that the troops (mainly conscripts) mobilized for major military operations (such as the Simaskian campaign of Su-Suen, for which see section 3.6) may have num­bered as many as 40,000 soldiers.^[160]

The unusually high efficiency of the empire's operations is attributable to its superb system of communications. Already at the very beginning of his reign, Sulgi established an extensive network of roads, resting places, and relay stations throughout Babylonia.^[161] Following the period of foreign conquests, this network was expanded throughout the periphery and far beyond it. An army of messengers and runners was created, who daily crisscrossed the empire from one end to an­other, carrying royal instructions.

As for the economic conditions existing in the periphery, it was already noted that the military settlements situated there were subject to the payment of taxes. Similar contributions were made by the vassal states of the empire. It is also known that the government systematically exploited the periphery’s natural resources, such as timber, stone, bitumen, and metals, even conducting mining operations in those ter­ritories. In the course of military operations, booty and prisoners of war were rou­tinely taken. As a result, large numbers of foreigners were brought to Babylonia over the years. While some of them were enslaved, the majority were settled on land and turned into the state’s dependents. All in all, however, since the empire also invested heavily in the maintenance of its institutions in the periphery, it would appear that on balance the main economic benefit it derived from the possession of the periphery was the profits from the control of international trade routes.

3.6. Su-Suen and Ibbi-Suen: Decline and Collapse

The stable conditions of Amar-Suen’s reign continued to prevail during the first years of his successor and son Su-Suen (2037-2029). Both Babylonia and its periphery enjoyed peace and prosperity, while the king himself focused his attention on the prop­agation of his divine cult.^[162] As a result of those efforts, temples of the divine Su-Suen were erected throughout the empire, even in such remote places as Urbilum. But soon problems began appearing on the horizon. They began with a revolt in Simanum, which removed its ruling family from power (year Su-Suen 3). Given the importance of Simanum as a vital link in the empire’s security system, Su-Suen was forced to send troops to restore order there. This operation seems to have been successful, though additional security measures were needed as a consequence. Those included the estab­lishment of a number of new military settlements in that region.

The Simanum revolt may have been caused, at least in part, by the appearance of new Amorite tribes (Tidanum) on the scene. Be that as it may, those arrivals from the west began to become a major security problem, especially in the Diyala Region. Consequently, the line of fortifications built there by Sulgi (the “Wall of the Periphery”) was restored and expended under the name of the “Wall that Keeps Tidanum at Bay” (year Su-Suen 4).

A much more serious challenge to the empire arose shortly thereafter in the Simaskian lands. While most of those principalities had earlier been on good terms with the empire, with many of them enjoying the status of vassals, a large anti­Babylonian coalition now was formed among them, which was led by the land of Zabsali.^[163] Since this development directly threatened Babylonia’s hold of the Great

Khurasan Road and the neighboring regions, a determined military response was necessary. Accordingly, a major campaign was launched by Su-Suen against the Simaskian lands (year Su-Suen 7). As result of this operation, which was the first such large military undertaking since Sulgi's reign, the coalition was crushed and the whole region severely punished, looted, and brought back to obedience. In the aftermath of this campaign, at least two Simaskian lands were annexed to the em­pire. Like the campaign itself, this was the first significant expansion of the empire's borders since the time of Sulgi.

Although the Simaskian campaign seemingly was a great success, it is clear that, by the end of Su-Suen's reign, serious cracks had appeared throughout the empire's structure, and that the whole project began to teeter on the brink of disaster. In a last, desperate attempt to save the empire, just before Su-Suen's death most of the key generalships were consolidated in the hands of the chancellor Aradmu, who be­came virtual viceroy of the peripheral defensive system.

Still, on the accession of Ibbi-Suen (2028-2004), Su-Suen's son and the last ruler of the dynasty, nobody could foresee that the end would come so soon. The events, which followed one another like an avalanche, began with the revolt of Babylonia's old enemy Simurrum. Although a military campaign was sent there (year Ibbi-Suen 3), it is certain that it failed, and that Simurrum re-established its full independence. With the loss of Simurrum, Ibbi-Suen lost the control of the Great Khurasan Road. In response to these events, the Simaskian Yabrat, one of staunchest allies of Babylonia (as the proxy ruler of AnBan), sensing the death of the empire, turned against Ibbi-Suen and took over the Susiana.⁵⁰ Ibbi-Suen tried to fight back, establishing an alliance with Su-Suen's enemy Zabsali (year Ibbi- Suen 5), in hope of turning the tide. But all of this was in vain. As in addition the Amorites invaded the Diyala Region, the system of the defensive settlements, so laboriously and meticulously put together by Sulgi, disintegrated—and with it the whole imperial design.

The Ur III state lingered for 20 more years. But the final events of Ibbi-Suen's reign, such as the rise of Isbi-Erra of Isin and the conquest of Ur by the Simaskians, do not need to occupy us here, since the Ur III Empire and the “Grand Strategy” it was based on were both long gone by that time.

3.7. Causes of the Collapse

Since the Ur III Empire was such an intelligent and deliberately designed construct, the question of course arises: Why did it fail, and so suddenly at that? This question is especially pertinent if one considers the small size of the empire and its prag­matic and essentially non-aggressive posture vis-à-vis its foreign possessions and the outside world more generally. Logically, both the highly limited nature of its

foreign engagement and the security system it established with its partners, which was based on shared economic interests, should have made it more resilient and du­rable. Such a calculation may have also been made by Sulgi and his successors, but logic is not a sure guide in strategic planning.

As in the case of the Sargonic enterprise, it was undoubtedly structural—rather than political—factors that were mainly responsible for the collapse of the Ur III Empire. But whereas histoire evenementielle contributed significantly to the Sargonic collapse, its role in the Ur III instance appears to have been minimal. Among the structural factors that were responsible for the Ur III collapse we may identify the following, in the order of importance:

(1) The main reason behind the failure of the Ur III “Grand Strategy” is likely the fact that, rather than on raw military power, it relied too much on dip­lomatic arrangements with its allies and vassals. Although this intricate net­work of agreements and understandings could be kept together for a couple of decades, through patching it here and there as the need arose (the reign of Su-Suen), due to the varied and changing interests of the parties involved it was unsustainable in the long run.

(2) Whether by design or due to economic constraints, Ur III military resources were in themselves insufficient to maintain stability in the periphery and its adjoining territories. This situation was compounded by the fact that the army included very significant numbers of foreign mercenary troops. The loyalty of those foreigners to the king of Ur was probably highly questionable, especially when the imperial system began to crumble.

(3) Because of its great centralization and the incredible intricacy of its organi­zation, the Ur III economic system was inherently vulnerable, as its existence depended on the perfect functioning of all its component parts. This vulnera­bility was heightened by the economy's high degree of regional specialization, which made the empire largely dependent for its supplies of cereals and other agricultural products on southern Babylonia. As a consequence, even a com­paratively small disruption in the functioning of this system could render the whole virtually inoperable—as illustrated by the events of the beginning of Ibbi-Suen's reign.

(4) Unavoidably, contact with the empire's institutions must have hastened state­formation processes among its adversaries in the periphery. Although this development did not contribute directly to the empire's demise, it played a significant role in the latter part of Ibbi-Suen's reign, when foreign enemies grew sufficiently strong to conquer Babylonia itself.

(5) Yet another factor appears to have been the “internationalization” of the em­pire, by which large numbers of foreigners assumed important positions in its central institutions. As in the case of foreign troops in Ur's employ, in the long run these individuals were a destabilizing element. While becoming influen­tial insiders, but only superficially embracing the values and goals of the Ur III Empire, they probably contributed to the collapse, insofar as they tended to think primarily of their own interests and to cultivate their prior ethnic and political allegiances. Particularly instructive here is the case of diplo­matic marriages, which was such a characteristic feature of the Ur III foreign policy. The offspring of such unions, instead of becoming loyal Babylonians and carriers of the empire's banner in the periphery, exploited their familial ties with the royal family to claim a share of the empire's inheritance, and even to aspire to the Babylonian crown itself (like Isbi-Erra, a Mari prince and an erstwhile Babylonian official, who, after the downfall of Ur, captured most of Babylonia, turning it into the new state of Isin).

3.8. Legacy

Unlike the Sargonic Empire, the Ur III experiment had no perceptible impact on later history. Although Sulgi was remembered—and even revered—down to the very end of cuneiform civilization, his accomplishments as an empire builder never appealed to the imagination of later generations. This assuredly was due to the small scale of Ur III territorial conquests, which apparently were not deemed sufficiently spectacular to be worthy of emulation. This perception certainly was not helped by the fact that, despite all the meticulous planning and hard work that went into its creation, the Ur III Empire had been such a re­sounding failure.

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