Empire Entrenched

As wealth was concentrated in a small circle of royal dependents with their fates linked directly to the ruler in exchange for wielding executive power, the state grew stronger in authority but more fragile in structure.^[313] Elites transcended the imperial melting pot and came to represent more than the sum of the provinces.

On a cosmological level this was celebrated in grand triumphs,^[314] elaborate court ceremonies,^[315] and imperial gardens that set the precedent for the later Persian paradises.^[316] In parades of vanquished enemies and the relocation of plants and animals from the four corners of the world, a new and fictitious imperial landscape of universal power was fashioned and projected.

The cosmopolis of the great imperial capital at Nineveh itself came to embody the empire in its diversity and fragility. Ambivalence toward foreign influences is manifest in anxieties of adaptation and counteracted by tendencies of anti- quarianism and exoticism.^[317] Foreign traditions were both fused and rejected in policy, art, and scholarship, leading to a radical restructuring of imperial identity. Gravitation toward the capital at the expense of the provinces became problematic as there was little focus on promoting an Assyrian identity outside the imperial elite. The two major vehicles of integration and assimilation—l arge-scale deportation and the imperial army—ultimately proved counterproductive as national identities were retained (and sometimes even emphasized) in exile or through ethnically based military auxiliaries. Professional identities became gradually emphasized in the imperial core^[318] as the empire stretched between simultaneous cultural homogenization and ethnic fragmentation. The foundation of cities populated by people from across Western Asia was a new phenomenon, decisive for the flux in political and cultural identities that shaped the environment in which the foundational religious and moral traditions of new religions and philosophies were formed.

But Assyrian views on Assyria also reveal a struggle between imperial and ethnic identities of the subjugated people, many of whom were “counted as Assyrians” and became part of the imperial conglomerate.^[319]

Rulers made use of both stick and carrot to hold on to power, often at great expense for the royal treasury. Financial support for the cities of Babylonia during the reign of Sargon II according to his own estimate exceeded 4.5 tons of gold and 50 tons of silver. This staggering sum is indicative of a somewhat uneven policy toward the old cities of the south^[320] that combined ambivalence of conquest with cultural reverence and included the imposition of rule as well as exemption from normal levies of corvee, taxation, and military drafts. The ideology of Babylonia as the “cultural cradle” of Assur led to hesitant and oftentimes contradictory policies^[321] that proved dangerous to imperial integrity in the long run.

With the increased aligning of power around the king as individual, royal death became an auspicious time that left the state in a dangerous state of limbo. Loyalties were personal and had to be reaffirmed. All treaties, which were always individual and predicated upon oaths rather than being ratified between abstract state entities, had to be renegotiated. Principles and policies were re-established. All offices were reappointed. After the particularly long reign of Assurbanipal (668— ca. 627) this system suffered a shock and was never properly reset. As new loyalties were formed, several candidates for the throne emerged, and opposing alliances weakened the chain of command. As long as the empire would offer opportunity as a viable alternative to devastation, the system would endure. Once it ceased to do so, the structure collapsed.

The fall of the Assyrian Empire has been called a “historical scandal” due to its apparent inexplicability and suddenness.^[322] But the imperial template or “idea” of how an empire styles itself endured and came to form a model for the empires that followed.

Assyria itself fell into ruin within a generation of its peak and disappeared almost without physical trace after 1,500 years as a vivid political and cultural force. According to later tradition, the catalyst for its downfall was a coalition of discontented Median and Babylonian tribal leaders.^[323] In fact, the empire had been torn by civil wars and court rivalry several times in history, and yet, it had always survived such periods of internal weakness and dynastic strife. It seems to be the unprecedented territorial expansion and political centralization of the last century of empire which brought about the societal changes on a deeper level that rendered the structure vulnerable.^[324] Assyria had become more dependent upon its ability to rule through existing local political and social structures and had grown more inclusive and tolerant of regional variation within its frontiers at the expense of cultural integrity and administrative homogeneity. The mass deportations had culminated during the reigns of Tiglath-Pileser III, Sargon, and Sennacherib, and appear to have decreased during the final two generations of the empire. Perhaps they had proved too costly or too difficult to manage, or perhaps there were fewer people left to move. The great urban centers of Nineveh, Kalhu, and Arbela had grown to a point where they could no longer survive on local agricultural production and were dependent upon outside labor and provisions. In spite of the effort to create the required physical infrastructure and the use of designated agricultural areas to intensify food production for the cities, the income that was generated in the extensive newly subjugated areas may have proven lower than the cost of the required military presence.

It also became increasingly difficult to isolate imperial clients from each other, and the upkeep of the civic privileges that were used to bargain for loyalty from local authorities became progressively more demanding on the imperial treasury.

The system of royal patronage was strong at the center but not very far-reaching, so to penetrate underlying structures, the empire made use of a developed network of resident state agents who actively sought to capitalize on local political dissent. Such attempts often backfired, at least in part due to the complex network of states and local political alliances surrounding Assyria that had been strengthened under imperial pressure. Indirect hegemony through local clients presumably began as a cost-effective approach but proved insufficient in the longer run. Eventually client states were either de facto abandoned by the empire (Central Anatolia, Egypt) or were turned into provinces (Cilicia, Commagene, Sidon). In some cases, the heavy tribute levied from client rulers would be a cause of conflict between local elites and their subjects and could later lead to imperial intervention and trigger the

transformation of a client state into an imperial province. But more often, emphasis appears to have been upon ensuring security in lieu of an irregular income from outlying areas. In essence, Assyrian imperialism became a self-perpetuating mechanism in search of security, resources, and a balance of power and funding that could not be achieved.

Power struggles between the city-states and tribal or kinship groups in Babylonia were a particular stumbling stone.¹⁷² The old urban centers were revered by the Assyrians for reasons of culture, and peace was preserved both through civic privileges and by actively manipulating Babylonian urban traditions of kingship in relation to the resident tribal groups.¹⁷³ The urbanites traditionally defined themselves in political and cultural terms; their populations were multiethnic, proclaimed no common ancestry, and shared their language, religion, and culture with a number of other cities. They defined themselves on the basis of a civic identity and local belonging, and were characterized by a formal and highly institutionalized type of community.

The tribal groups (Aramean, Chaldean, and Arab) identified by affiliation to a common ancestor and were not primarily bound by territory. Assyria's failure to divide and rule these two groups in the long run became an important reason for its downfall. After the devastating civil war of652-648 все, significant parts of the population in Babylonia had become permanently alienated from the empire. In addition, the retaliatory attack that destroyed Elam for its support of Babylonia in the war led to a fundamental shift in the political power balance and an opening up of the eastern flanks of the empire.

The inner threat to the head of state by palace intrigue and dynastic squabble also meant that Assyria gradually came to hollow out its own infrastructure of power in favor of autocracy.¹⁷⁴ Provincial governors and high-ranking military officials held positions of great political and social authority until the mid-eighth century все, but with the reforms of Tiglath-Pileser III, the king in effect became an absolute ruler. The magnates, most of whom were eunuchs, were dependent upon the king as person for their position, and held no claim to authority through hereditary right. The uppermost echelon of society grew separate from the traditional landed elite, and the latter appears to have had mounting difficulties in meeting the requirements of the former. The late Assyrian Empire promoted the idea of a multinational state and came to invest its legitimacy directly in the public personality of the current ruler instead of the institutions of monarchy and aristocracy. When Assurbanipal died in ca. 627 все after almost four decades of rule, the transition of authority did not go smoothly and, in reality, the empire never recovered. As enemies struck the weakened Assyria, it shattered not only the empire. The heartland reverted to agricultural subsistence¹⁷⁵ and its population collapsed. Presumably, tens of thousands starved or fled.¹⁷⁶ The traditional elites of the heartland had been eliminated as a

¹⁷² Frame 1992; von Dassow 1999.

¹⁷³ Barjamovic 2004.

¹⁷⁴ Yoffee and Cowgill 1988.

¹⁷⁵ Liverani 2001; Yoffee 2007.

¹⁷⁶ Ur 2017.

hindrance to royal centralization and military efficiency. This explains why Assyria disappeared so totally after its defeat. There was no default structure to fall back on, and nothing from which to build. Without the king, there was no state.

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Source: Bang Peter F., Bayly C.A., Scheidel Walter (eds.). The Oxford World History of Empire. Volume Two: The History of Empires. Oxford University Press,2020. — 1352 p.. 2020

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