NOTES

As anyone who reads this book will see, a great deal of my thinking about many topics has been shaped by the work of Frank Ramsey. I should like to acknowledge here my teacher Hugh Mellor, who introduced me to Ramsey (and to so much else in philosophy).

I am grateful, too, to many students on whom I have tried out these ideas over the last couple of decades. And, finally, I am grateful to Larry King, whose idea that earlier book was.

The sources for the material cited in the chapters are given here, with the sections in which the citations occur.

It is always a good idea to check in the Roiutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward Craig, ed. (Routledge, London and New York, 2000) if you want to get either a reliable introduction to a topic or advice about further reading. This is also available on CD-ROM and on the Web. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich, ed. (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1995), is a wonderful source of introductory dis­cussions. I also highly recommend the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, in particu­lar those that I list below. There are many good introductions to various fields of philos­ophy in the Foundations of Philosophy series (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey); and most of the individual philosophers of the period before the twentieth cen­tury that I have discussed are well introduced in the Past Masters series (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford).

Blackwell Companions

Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, A Companion to Epistemology (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1992).

Robert E.

Philosophy (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1993). Samuel Guttenplan, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell Publishers,

Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1996).

Dennis Patterson, A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1999).

Peter Singer, A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1993).

Crispin Wright and Bob Hale, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1999).

Introduction

The quote from Williams comes in the following passage, which is worth citing in full: “What distinguishes analytical philosophy from other contemporary philosophy (though not from much philosophy of other times) is a certain way of going on, which involves argument, distinctions, and, so far as it remembers to try to achieve it and succeeds, moderately plain speech. As an alternative to plain speech, it distinguishes sharply between obscurity and technicality. It always rejects the first, but the second it some­times finds a necessity. This feature peculiarly enrages some of its enemies. Wanting philosophy to be at once profound and accessible, they resent technicality but are com­forted by obscurity.” Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Fontana, London; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985), p. 6.

Chapter 1: Mind

1.2    I have translated the passages from Descartes myself.

Puis, examinant avec attention ce que j’etois, et voyant que je pouvois fein- dre que je n’avois aucun corps, et qu’il n’y avoit aucun monde ni aucun lieu ou je fusse; mais que je ne pouvois pas feindre pour cela que je n’etois point; et qu’au contraire de cela meme que je pensois a douter de la verite des autres choses, il suivoit tres evidemment et tres certainement que j’e­tois; au lieu que si j’eusse seulement cesse de penser, encore que tout le reste de ce que j’avois jamais imagine eut ete vrai, je n’avois aucune raison de croire que j’eusse ete; je connus de la que j’etois une substance dont toute l’essence ou la nature n’est que de penser, et qui pour etre n’a besoin d’aucun lieu ni ne depend d’aucune chose materielle; en sorte que ce moi, c’est-a-dire lame, par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, est entierement dis- tincte du corps, et meme qu’elle est plus aisee a connoιtre que lui, et qu’en- core qu’il ne fut point, elle ne lairroit pas d’etre tout ce qu’elle est.

In these notes I give page references to F. E. Sutcliffe’s easily available translation Discourse on Method and the Meditations (Penguin, New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968). This passage is on page 54.

1.3    References to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Macmillan, New York; Blackwell, Oxford, 1953), are usu­ally made to the numbered sections. The quotation is section 258.

1.4    There is an excellent discussion of functionalism in Jerry Fodor, “The Mind Body Problem,” Scientific American 244.1 (1981): 114-123.

1.7    The “simple theory of pain” is from Ned Block’s “Introduction: What Is Functionalism?” in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Ned Block, ed.

1.9 The phenomenological objection to functionalism is well articulated in Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology op. cit., Volume I, pp. 159-168.

1.11  Hugh Mellor’s proposal about second-order beliefs is in “Higher Order Degrees of Belief,” in D. H. Mellor, ed., Prospectsfor Pragmatism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980).

1.11 Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Bradford Books/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983).

1.11  Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Bradford Books/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987).

1.12  The argument of this section was suggested to me by Galen Strawson’s Mental Reality (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994).

Chapter 2: Knowledge

2.1    Why Albert and Marie? Well, Albert for Einstein (the Brain) and Marie for Curie (the great scientist)! But I don’t want to suggest that Marie Curie was unscrupulous.

2.3    Irving Thalberg’s “In Defense of Justified True Belief’ (referred to here) is in the Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969).

2.3    The long passages are from the First Meditation (Sutcliffe, p.

Je supposerai donc qu’il y a, non point un vrai Dieu, qui est la sou- veraine source de verite, mais un certain mauvais genie, non moins ruse et trompeur que puissant qui a employe toute son industrie a me tromper. Je penserai que le ciel, l’air, la terre, les couleurs, les figures, les sons et toutes les choses exterieures que nous voyons, ne sont que des illusions et tromperies, dont il se sert pour surprendre ma credulite.

And

Mais je me suis persuade qu’il n’y avait rien du tout dans le monde, qu’il n’y avait aucun ciel, aucune terre, aucuns esprits, ni aucuns corps ; ne me suis-je donc pas aussi persuade que je n’etais point? Non certes, j’etais sans doute, si je me suis persuade, ou seulement si j’ai pense quelque chose. Mais il y a un je ne sais quel trompeur tres puissant et tres ruse, qui emploie toute son industrie a me tromper toujours. Il n’y a donc point de doute que je suis, s’il me trompe; et qu’il me trompe tant qu’il voudra il ne saurait jamais faire que je ne sois rien, tant que je penserai etre quelque chose. De sorte qu’apres y avoir bien pense, et voir soigneusement examine toutes choses, enfin il faut conclure, et tenir pour constant que cette proposition: Je suis, j’existe, est necessairement vraie, toutes les fois que je la prononce, ou que je la conςois en mon esprit.

2.4, The quotations from Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the

2.5    Everyman edition, John Yolton, ed. (Dutton, New York; Dent, London, 1961) are: Book Two, Chapter One, Section 2, Volume I, p. 77; Book Two, Chapter One, Sections 3 and 4, Volume I, pp.

2.6    For a discussion of the verification principle by one of the founders of logical positivism, see Moritz Schlick, “Meaning and Verification,” Philosophical Review 45 (1936): 146-170, reprinted in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1948).

2.7    Gettier’s “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” appeared originally in the journal Analysis 23.6 (1963). It is widely reprinted.

2.7    Alvin I. Goldman’s paper “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” which appeared originally in The Journal of Philosophy 73.20 (1976), is reprinted in G. Pappas and M. Swain, eds., Knowledge and Justification (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978). The quotation is in Knowledge and Justification, p. 122.

2.9    The quotation is from Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York, Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 82. Quine’s comments about the analogy with engineering are in his “Reply to Morton White” in The Philosophy of W V. Quine, L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp, eds. (Open Court, La Salle, 1986), pp. 663-5.

2.10  For examples of the range of evidence from cognitive psychology about the respects in which our ways of forming beliefs are not in fact such as to maximize the chance of their being true, see Massimo Piatelli-Palmerini, Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule Our Minds (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1996).

Chapter 3: Language

3.2 Ian Hacking’s Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975), which I mention in this section, was very helpful to me in thinking about the first part of this chapter.

3.2 Richard Rorty’s The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophic Method (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967) has a useful introduction that dis­cusses the rise of linguistic philosophy.

3.2    The three quotations from Thomas Hobbes’ The Elements of Philosophy: Concerning Body are from Chapter Two, Sections 1 and 3, reprinted in Hobbes Selections, FJ.E. Woodbridge, ed. (Scribner’s, New York, 1958), pp. 13-15.

3.3    The quotation is from section 293 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, (op. cit.).

3.3    My account of Frege is very much based on Michael Dummett’s in his Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York, Harper and Row, 1973). Frege’s paper, enti- tied “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung,” was first published in Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, NF 100, 1892, 25-50. I have made my own translation of Gottlob Frege’s “On Sense and Reference,” with assis­tance from Max Black’s translation in The Frege Reader, Michael Beaney, ed. (Blackwell Publishers Limited, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1997). Unlike that translation, I have capitalized the initial letters of “Morning Star” and “Evening Star,” to make it clear that these are names and not shorthand descrip­tions. The quotation is on page 29 (compare Black, op. cit., p. 154). The original German reads:

Von der Bedeutung und dem Sinne eines Zeichens ist die mit ihm verknupfte Vorstellung zu unterscheiden. Wenn die Bedeutung eines Zeichens ein sinnlich wahrnehmbarer Gegenstand ist, so ist meine Vorstellung davon ein aus Erinnerungen von Sinneseindrucken, die ich gehabt habe, und von Tatigkeiten, inneren sowohl wie auβeren, die ich ausgeubt habe, ent- standenes inneres Bild. Dieses ist oft mit Gefuhlen getrankt; die Deutlichkeit seiner einzelnen Teile ist verschieden und schwankend. Nicht immer ist, auch bei demselben Menschen, dieselbe Vorstellung mit demsel- ben Sinne verbunden. Die Vorstellung ist subjektiv: die Vorstellung des einen ist nicht die des anderen. Damit sind von selbst mannigfache Unterschiede der mit demselben Sinne verknupften Vorstellungen gegeben. Ein Maler, ein Reiter, ein Zoologe werden wahrscheinlich sehr verschiedene Vorstellungen mit dem Namen “Bucephalus” verbinden.

3.4    The Frege quotation is from page 32. (Compare Black, op. cit., p. 156). The orig­inal German reads:

Wir fragen nun nach Sinn und Bedeutung eines ganzen Behauptungssatzes. Ein solcher Satz enthalt einen Gedanken. Ist dieser Gedanke nun als dessen Sinn oder als dessen Bedeutung anzusehen? Nehmen wir einmal an, der Satz habe eine Bedeutung! Ersetzen wir nun in ihm ein Wort durch ein anderes von derselben Bedeutung, aber anderem Sinne, so kann dies auf die Bedeutung des Satzes keinen EinfluB haben. Nun sehen wir aber, daβ der Gedanke sich in solchem Falle andert; denn es ist z.B. der Gedanke des Satzes “der Morgenstern ist ein von der Sonne beleuchteter Korper” ver- schieden von dem des Satzes “der Abendstern ist ein von der Sonne beleuchteter Korper”. Jemand, der nicht wuβte, daβ der Abendstern der Morgenstern ist, konnte den einen Gedanken fur wahr, den anderen fur falsch halten. Der Gedanke kann also nicht die Bedeutung des Satzes sein, vielmehr werden wir ihn als den Sinn aufzufassen haben.

3.4    Footnote 5 contains the remark about thought’s being objective: “Ich verstehe unter Gedanken nicht das subjektive Tun des Denkens, sondern dessen objek- tiven Inhalt, der fahig ist, gemeinsames Eigentum von vielen zu sein.”

3.4    The definition of a truth value is from page 34. (Compare Black, op. cit., pp. 157-158.) The original German reads: “Ich verstehe unter dem Wahrheitswerte eines Satzes den Umstand, daβ er wahr oder daβ er falsch ist. Weitere Wahrheitswerte gibt es nicht.”

3.4    The Frege quotation is from pages 37-38. (Compare Black, op. cit., p. 161.) The original German reads: “Mit Recht kann man nur folgern... daβ ‘Morgenstern’ nicht immer den Planeten Venus bedeutet.”

3.12  Jerry Fodor’s The Language of Thought (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1975), which I mention here, was a major influence on my discussion in this chapter and in Chapter 1.

3.13  G. E. Moore’s “A Reply to My Critics,” in The PhilosoⁱPhy of G. E. Moore, P. A. Schillp, ed. (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1942), pp. 319-43, contains Moore’s latest discussion of the paradox of analysis.

3.13  Quine’s arguments against analyticity are to be found in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” which is in From a Logical Point of View (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1953.)

Chapter 4: Science

4.5    Hilary Putnam introduced the expression “the received view” in “What Theories Are Not” in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski, eds. (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1962).

4.5 Frederick Suppe, ed., The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd ed. (University of Illinois Press, Chicago and London, 1977) provides a very good advanced introduction to recent philosophy of science, including the “received view,” its problems, and major alternatives, in Suppe’s critical introduction and afterword.

4.7    The quotation from Grover Maxwell is from “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities,” in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science III (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962), p. 7.

4.7    For N. R. Hanson’s discussion of theory-ladenness, see his Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge, 1965).

4.7    Sellars makes his arguments against the myth of the given in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception, and Reality (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963.) There’s a good brief discussion of the issue in the article on “The Given,” in A Companion to Epistemology, Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds. (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and New Malden, MA, 1992), pp. 159-62.

4.8    The quotation from Hume is from Section Four, Part II of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Eric Steinberg, ed. (Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, 1984), p. 24.

4.8    Goodman’s “grue” arguments are to be found in Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1951).

4.9    lang=EN-US>Karl Popper’s main ideas in philosophy of science are to be found in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Hutchinson, London, 1959) and in Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963).

4.12 Inference to the best explanation was first explored by Gil Harman in “The Inference to the Best Explanation,” Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 88-95.

Chapter 5: Morality

5.2    The quotation from Hume is from Book III, Part 1, Section 1 of A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., rev. P. H. Nidditch (Clarendon Press, New York and Oxford, 1978), pp. 469-70.

5.3    The quotation from G.E.M. Anscombe is from Intention (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000).

5.4    The quotation from G. E. Moore is from Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1903), p. 148.

5.4    The quotation is from Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics (Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1966; Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967), pp. 252-53.

5.6    The quotations from Kant are from pp. 88-90 of The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated and analyzed by H. J. Paton (Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1964).

5.7    The quotation from R. M. Hare is from Moral Thinking (Clarendon Press, New York and Oxford, 1981), p. 90.

5.9    Frank Ramsey’s work is collected in his Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics, D. H. Mellor, ed. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978).

5.10  The quotations from R. M. Hare are from sections 2.3 and 2.4 of Moral Thinking, cited above.

5.10 The quotations from Jonathan Glover’s Causing Death and Saving Lives (Penguin, New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1977) are from pp. 73 and 79.

5.12 My brief account of some aspects of Aristotle’s ethics is based on J. O. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1988), which I highly recom­mend.

Chapter 6: Politics

6.1    My somewhat idealized account of the Mbuti is based on Colin Turnbull’s Wayward Servants: The Two Worlds of the African Pygmies (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1976) and The Forest People (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1968).

6.2    The quotations from Thomas Hobbes are all from Part I, Chapters 11 (pp. 160-168), 13 (pp. 183-88), and 15 (pp. 201-17), of Leviathan, C. B. Macpherson, ed. (Penguin, New York & Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1985).

6.4    The quotation is from Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic books, New York, 1974), p. 7.

6.4 My exposition is based on Morton Davis’s Game Theory: A Non-Technical Introduction, rev. ed. (Basic Books, New York, 1983). The quotation is from p. 13.

6.7    The quotation is from John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), p. 137.

6.8    The quotation from Robert Paul Wolff is from Understanding Rawls (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1977), pp. 31-32.

6.9    This section, like the last, is much influenced by Wolff’s Understanding Rawls. I am grateful, too, for his help in revising the version of this section that appeared in Necessary Questions, on which this section is very closely based.

6.11 The quotation from John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice is from p. 15.

6.11 The quotation is from Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 195.

6.13 The quotation from John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice is from p. 302.

6.13  The short quotation defining historical principles is from Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 155.

6.14  The quotations from Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia are from pp. ix, 118, and ix again.

6.14  C. B. Macpherson has a good edition of John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, IN, 1980). The quotations are from Chapter 2, Section 6 (p. 9 of Macpherson’s edition).

6.15  Lawrence Davis formulates the outline I give of Nozick’s theory in “Nozick’s Entitlement Theory,” which appeared in The Journal of Philosophy 73.21 (1976) and is reprinted in Reading Nozick, Jeffrey Paul, ed. (Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p. 345.

6.15  The quotation from Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia is from the foot­note on p. 179.

6.16  I rely heavily on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “Some Ruminations on Rights,” which appeared originally in The University of Arizona Law Review 19 (1977), reprinted in Reading Nozick (op. cit.). The quotations are from pp. 137-38 of Reading Nozick.

Chapter 7: Law

7.1 The quote from Dr. King is in The Autobiography of Martin Luther 'King, Jr, ed. Clayborne Carson (Warner Books, New York, 1998), p. 193.

7.1 The quotation is from St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, 1a 2ae 90.4; cited in R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge University Press, New York and Cambridge, 1986), p. 74.

7.1    The quotation from John Austin is from The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart, ed. (The Humanities Press, New York, 1965; Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1954), p. 184.

7.2    The quotation is from p. 81 of R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (op. cit.), which has much influenced this chapter.

7.4    Chapters 5 and 6 of Herbert Hart’s The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, New York and Oxford, 1961) are relevant to section 7.4. The quotations are from pp. 70-79.

7.6    The quotation from Bentham is cited from Ted Honderich’s Punishment: The Supposed Justifications (Penguin, New York and Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1984), pp. 51-52.

7.7       The quotation from Kant is cited from Honderich’s book (op. cit.), p. 22.

Chapter 8: Metaphysics

8.3    I have used the version of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to be found in Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Nelson Pike, ed. (Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1970). The quotation here is from p. 40.

8.4    Anselm’s argument is to be found in Chapters 2 and 3 of his Proslogion, which is available in English in the Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson, trans. (The Arthur J. Banning Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2000). The passage I have quoted corresponds to a section on page 93 of this translation, but I have translated it somewhat more literally myself. The Latin reads:

Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest, quia hoc cum audit intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur in intellectu est. Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod maius est. Si ergo id quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intel- lectu: id ipsum quo maius cogitari non potest, est quo maius cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.

8.4    The quotation is from Descartes’ Fourth Discourse (Sutcliffe 57). The French reads as follows:

... car, par exemple, je voyois bien que, supposant un triangle, il falloit que ses trois angles fussent egaux a deux droits, mais je ne voyois rien pour cela qui m’assurat qu’il y eut au monde aucun triangle: au lieu revenant a exam­iner l’idee que j’avois d’un etre parfait, je trouvois que l’existence y etoit comprise en meme faςon qu’il est compris en celle d’un triangle que ses trois angles sont egaux a deux droits, ou en celle d’une sphere que toutes ses parties sont egalement distantes de son centre, ou meme encore plus evidemment; et que par consequent il est pour le moins aussi certain que Dieu, qui est cet etre si parfait, est ou existe, qu’aucune demonstration de geometrie le sauroit etre.

8.4face="Times New Roman">    Gaunilo’s argument can be found in On Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo, on p. 117 of Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury (op. cit). I have used the translation made available on the Web at the Internet Medieval Sourcebook: www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/anselm-gaunilo.html. The passage comes just before the end of the sixth section. The source for this online translation is St. Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo; and Cur Deus Homo, Sidney Norton Deane, trans. (The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1903; reprinted 1926).

8.5    The quotation is from Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.), p. 77.

8.6    The idea of a story world here is not the same as the one used by the designers of interactive games. A story world here is one of the infinite number of fully specified possible worlds where the things that are true in the fiction are true. There are many of them because fictions leave some things undetermined. So there are things that are true in Romeo and Juliet (they’re in love), things that are false (their families are happy about it), and things that are indeterminate (they both love peaches). The true things are true in all of the story worlds, the false things in none of them, and the indeterminate things are true in some of the story worlds. There is a number of different ways in which you might take up and develop these ideas; see, for example, Thomas Pavel, Fictional Worlds (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986).

8.7    The quotation is from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Alpha the less (ii.2.994a2), at page 36 of Aristotle Metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1960).

8.8    The translation of Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles is from Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings, Ralph McInerny, ed. and trans. Penguin, New York and London, 1998), p. 255.

8.9       See Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.), p. 22.

8.9    I quote Paley as cited on pp. 148-49 of Pike’s commentary in Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.).

8.9    The passage from the Metaphysics is on p. 13 of Richard Hope’s translation (op. cit.), i.4.985a.

8.11  The explanation of “argument from experience” is from p. 30 of Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.). My discussion of Hume’s argu­ment follows Nelson Pike’s very helpful treatment in Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit), pp. 148-57.

8.11  Philo’s remark about the limited range of our knowledge of the universe is on p. 29.

8.12  The statement of the argument from evil is from Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (op. cit.), p. 88. The quotation from John Hick is from p. 324 of his Evil and the God of Love (Harper and Row, San Francisco, CA, 1978).

8.12 For recent work on God and free will, see God, Foreknowledge and Freedom, John Martin Fischer, ed. (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1989).

Chapter 9: Philosophy

9.3. & 9.4 The quotations from Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande are from Eva Gillies’ abridged edition (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1976), pp. 201-3.

9.10  The issue as to whether modern physics is indeterministic is actually a good deal more intricate than my discussion in the text can suggest: Jeremy Butterfield’s article “Determinism and Indeterminism” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (op. cit.) provides a helpful starting point for this difficult topic.

9.10  The translation of Lucretius is from Book II, lines 251-57, p. 43 of the transla­tion by Sir Ronald Melville, Of the Nature of Things (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), as cited by Simon Blackburn in his excellent discussion of free will in Chapter 3 of Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

9.10  Schmidt’s experiments are discussed in “The Anomaly Called Psi: Recent Research and Criticism,” by K. Ramakrisna Rao and John Palmer, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (1987): 539-643. In the Schmidt experiment subjects were actually asked to anticipate which light was going to go on, rather than to try to affect the result. But clearly the machine could be used for psychokinesis (moving things by thought) as well as precognition (seeing the future).

9.11  A good deal of recent literature on moral responsibility is collected in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, eds. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993). There is an excellent introduction by the editors.

9.10 Robert Nozick’s observation about the thermostat is made in Philosophical Explanations (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1981), p. 315.